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Highlights 
 
 Insights from psychology and the philosophy of language help understanding of how 
people comprehend and reason with Description Logics 
 The use of natural language in knowledge representation languages can assist 
comprehension but also create ambiguity 
 Alternative or additional Manchester OWL Syntax keywords can significantly improve 
comprehension 
 An understanding of De Morgan‟s Laws and the analogous duality laws for restrictions 
would aid reasoning with Manchester OWL Syntax 
 Future development of knowledge representation languages should take account of 
psychological theories of reasoning and of how natural language is used 
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Improving comprehension of Knowledge Representation languages: a case study with 
Description Logics 
 
Paul Warren, Paul Mulholland, Trevor Collins, Enrico Motta 
Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University, U.K. 
Abstract 
 
Knowledge representation languages are frequently difficult to understand, particularly for 
those not trained in formal logic.  This is the case for Description Logics, which have been 
adopted for knowledge representation on the Web and in a number of application areas.  This 
work looks at the difficulties experienced with Description Logics; and in particular with the 
widely-used Manchester OWL Syntax, which employs natural language keywords.  The work 
comprises three studies.  The first two identify a number of difficulties which users 
experience, e.g. with negated intersection, functional properties, the use of subproperties and 
restrictions.  Insights from cognitive psychology and the study of language are applied to 
understand these difficulties.  Whilst these difficulties are in part inherent in reasoning about 
logic, and Description Logics in particular, they are made worse by the syntax.  In the third 
study, alternative syntactic constructs are proposed which demonstrate some improvement in 
accuracy and efficiency of comprehension.  In addition to proposing alternative syntactic 
constructs, the work makes some suggestions regarding training and support systems for 
Description Logics. 
 
Keywords: Description Logics; Manchester OWL Syntax; User studies; Psychological 
theories of reasoning 
1 Introduction 
 
Knowledge representation (KR) languages are in common use to describe domains ranging 
from biology to finance.  These languages are typically used by both computer scientists and 
domain experts.  Early KR languages frequently employed the frame-based paradigm, 
developed by Minsky (1975), and inspired to a certain extent by psychological 
considerations
1
.  In Minsky‟s (1975) approach frames, i.e. individual entities, have terminals, 
occupied by assignments, either by default or explicitly.  This is, to an extent, analogous to 
the model used in object-oriented programming.  An initial proposal was that frame-based 
representation be used for the Semantic Web (Lassila & McGuinness, 2001).   
 
In fact, an alternative paradigm was adopted for the Semantic Web, that of Description 
Logics (DLs).  DLs, and a reason for their adoption, are explained in Section 2.  Their 
adoption was in the form of a family of W3C-standardized languages known as OWL, a 
permuted acronym of Web Ontology Language (W3C, 2001).  As a result, DLs are now the 
dominant languages for specifying ontologies (Warren et al., 2014b).  Moreover, they have 
been heavily studied by logicians; their computational properties are well understood and 
efficient reasoners have been developed.  The initial interest by logicians also meant that 
early syntaxes were influenced by formal logic, and were perceived as not being ideal for 
domain experts with little training in logic and computer science
2
.  In response to this, the 
                                                 
1
 Although psychologically inspired, the frame-based approach has been placed on a rigorous logical 
foundation, e.g. see Kifer et al. (1995). 
2
 As will be discussed later, recent work has challenged this view (Alharbi et al., 2017). 
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Manchester OWL Syntax (MOS) (Horridge et al., 2006) was developed, making use of 
English keywords
3
.  MOS is now a widely-used syntax. 
 
Throughout these developments, there has been relatively little research into the difficulties 
which users of knowledge representation languages experience and the benefits, or otherwise, 
of the use of natural language.  The research described in this paper investigates the 
difficulties which people experience in understanding and reasoning with DLs, in particular 
when expressed using MOS.  The work takes ideas from the theory of reasoning in cognitive 
psychology and from the study of language, and applies these ideas to understand the 
difficulties experienced.   
 
Section 2 provides an introduction to DLs and to the difficulties experienced with their use.  
Section 3 then provides an overview of various theories of reasoning developed by 
psychologists, and also some ideas from the study of language.  Section 4 discusses the 
methodology used in the subsequent studies.  Section 5 then describes the initial, exploratory 
study.  This study focussed on commonly used DL constructs and identified a number of 
difficulties.  The second study, described in section 6, investigated these difficulties in more 
detail, and also looked at some additional DL constructs.  These studies suggested some 
modifications to the syntax which were investigated in a third study, described in section 7.  
Finally, section 8 discusses some implications of the work and makes some proposals for 
future research.   
2 Description Logics, OWL and the Manchester OWL Syntax 
 
This section provides a brief overview of DLs and the MOS syntax.  It also describes some 
previous research into the difficulties which ontology developers experience with DLs. 
 
2.1 Description Logics – overview 
 
DLs are based on subsets of First Order Logic (FOL).  However, FOL is concerned with 
defining and manipulating propositions; quantifiers are used to define propositions and 
Boolean operators to combine and negate them.  DLs provide a language for individuals and 
classes; restrictions are used to define classes and Boolean concept constructors to combine 
and complement those classes.  This will be illustrated in the next subsection.  For an 
introduction to the theory of DLs, including the OWL standard, see Baader et al. (2017). 
 
A key feature of DLs is the use of the Open World Assumption (OWA).  The absence of a 
fact from a DL knowledgebase does not imply that the fact is not true.  This contrasts with 
the Closed World Assumption (CWA) commonly assumed in database usage.  Thus, if Jane 
Smith is not specified as the employee of a particular company in a DL knowledgebase, we 
cannot assume that she is not a company employee.  We can only know that Jane Smith is not 
an employee if this information is in the knowledgebase, or can be deduced from other 
knowledgebase information.  Another aspect of the OWA is that two names may refer to the 
same entity; Jane Smith and J. Smith may be the same person.  We can only know they are 
                                                 
3
 MOS can be regarded as a Controlled Natural Language (CNL).  It is, however, very restricted in its use of 
English, and Kuhn (2014), in a survey of CNLs, regards MOS as not sufficiently natural to be classified as a 
CNL.  A number of DL languages have been developed which might more genuinely be regarded as CNLs.  
Schwitter et al. (2008) provide a comparison of three of these.  Warren (2017; Section 2.5.3) provides a 
discussion of CNLs for DLs. 
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different if the knowledgebase explicitly says so, or if this can be deduced from other 
information.  The OWA was a major reason for the adoption of DLs as a knowledge 
representation language for use on the World Wide Web (WWW).  Unlike knowledge in 
corporate databases, knowledge on the WWW is rarely complete.  The OWA also makes DLs 
appropriate for certain application areas, e.g. biological research (Stevens et al., 2007).  
However, the OWA does present difficulties.  Rector et al. (2004) claim that it is “the biggest 
single hurdle to understanding OWL and Description Logics”. 
 
DLs are concerned with three types of entities: 
 classes 
 individuals, or instances, which are members of the classes 
 object properties, which are defined between members of particular classes 
 
As an example, we might have classes Person and Dog, with individuals Tom and Rover 
respectively, and a property has_pet, so that we could include a fact in the knowledgebase: 
Tom has_pet Rover.  Here Tom is the subject, and Rover the object of the property has_pet.  
The OWL standard also includes datatype properties, between individuals and literals.  We 
do not discuss these further as we do not believe that the problems of comprehension
4
 which 
they pose will be substantially different from those posed by object properties. 
 
2.2 Syntax and standardization 
 
Since DLs were designed by logicians, the initial syntaxes were based on formalisms from 
logic.  An example of this is the „German DL‟ syntax.  This used ⊔, ⊓, and ¬ for union, 
intersection and complement.  Krötzsch et al. (2012) note that, by analogy with logic, these 
three operations are also referred to as disjunction, conjunction and negation.  The existential 
(∃) and universal quantifier (∀) symbols are used to represent restrictions.  For example: ∃ 
P.X defines a class containing those individuals which are the subject of a property P 
possessing an object in X, i.e. all the individuals a for which an individual b exists, such that 
a P b and b ∈ X.  Note that, although we are using the symbol for existential quantification, 
we are dealing with classes, not propositions, and the symbol is being used in a different way 
to its use as a quantifier. 
 
Similarly, ∀ P.X defines a class containing all elements a such that, either: 
 whenever a is the subject of an instance of P, the object is in the class X, or 
 a is never the subject of an instance of X. 
The second possibility is known as the „trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction‟.  It 
corresponds to the convention in logic that any property holds for every element of the empty 
set. 
 
The adoption of DLs for use on the WWW led to the definition of the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL), and this was accompanied by a variety of alternative syntaxes to German 
DL.  Some of these were perceived as being verbose, and  MOS was developed to be both 
relatively succinct and intelligible to non-logicians (Horridge et al., 2006; Horridge & Patel-
Schneider, 2008).  The chief features of MOS, as used in the studies reported in this paper, 
are shown in Table 1.  The key points to note are that: 
                                                 
4
 For brevity, we use the word comprehension to mean not just the interpretation of DL statements but also 
reasoning about those statements.   
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 or, and and not are used for union, intersection and complement.  This is consistent 
with the use of the terms disjunction, conjunction and negation. 
 some and only are used for the existential and universal restrictions.  Examples of this 
usage are shown later. 
 Properties can be defined to have the following characteristics: transitive; functional; 
inverse functional; symmetric; asymmetric; reflexive; and irreflexive.  Only the first 
four of these are used in the work reported here. 
 
MOS is used in the Protégé ontology editor
5
, which has been widely adopted (Warren et al., 
2014b). 
 
Table 1 Subset of MOS used in the studies 
  Syntax Semantics 
Entity 
declarations 
Class X X a class. 
Individual a a an individual. 
Property P P a property. 
Class 
expressions 
X or Y union of X and Y. 
X and Y intersection of X and Y. 
not X complement of X. 
Restrictions P some X the existential restriction, i.e. the class of 
individuals who are the subject of the property 
P with object in the class X. 
P only X the universal restriction, i.e. the class of 
individuals which are the subject of the 
property P, with objects only in X, plus those 
individuals which are not the subject of P. 
Class axioms X SubClassOf Y X a subclass of Y, i.e. if an individual is in X, it 
is also in Y. 
X EquivalentTo Y X and Y are equivalent classes, i.e. if an 
individual is in X, it is also in Y, and vice-versa. 
X DisjointWith Y X and Y are disjoint, i.e. if an individual is in X 
it is not in Y, and vice-versa. 
Z DisjointUnionOf 
W, X, Y … 
Z comprises all the individuals in W, X, and Y 
…, and no other individuals.  Moreover, W, X, 
and Y are pairwise-disjoint, i.e. there are no 
individuals contained in more than one of these 
classes. 
P Domain X All subjects of the object property P are in class 
X.  Equivalent to P some Thing SubClassOf X. 
P Range X All objects of the object property P are in class 
X.  Equivalent to Thing SubClassOf P only X. 
Individual 
axioms 
a Type X a a member of class X. 
a DifferentFrom b a and b different individuals. 
Property axioms P SubPropertyOf Q P is a subproperty of Q, i.e. if a P b, then a Q b. 
P InverseOf Q P and Q are mutually inverse properties. 
P Characteristics 
transitive … 
P has property characteristics, e.g. transitive. 
                                                 
5
 http://protege.stanford.edu/ 
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2.3 Difficulties using DLs 
 
Ontology developers, particularly non-logicians, experience difficulties using DLs.  Rector et 
al. (2004), based on their experience of teaching OWL DL, identified several such 
difficulties.  They were using „Manchester House Style‟, a precursor to MOS which used and 
and or for conjunction and disjunction, and someValuesFrom and allValuesFrom for the 
existential and universal restrictions.  The difficulties they identified included: a tendency to 
assume that allValuesFrom implies someValuesFrom, i.e. a tendency to overlook the second 
of the two possibilities associated with the universal restriction; confusion between and and 
or; and confusion between P someValuesFrom (not X) and not (P someValuesFrom X). 
 
Some difficulties arise from the keywords used.  Other difficulties are inherent in DL but can 
be exacerbated or mitigated by choice of keywords.  In the former category, the confusion 
between and and or is caused by the particular choice of these keywords; as will be argued 
later, intersection and union are less ambiguous.  In the latter category, the tendency to 
overlook the „trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction‟, as discussed in subsection 2.2, is 
inherent in DL but, as also will be discussed later, can be made worse or mitigated by the 
choice of syntax. 
 
Rector et al. (2004) also recommended writing paraphrases of OWL statements.  In these 
paraphrases, in anticipation of the later MOS, the universal restriction was represented using 
only.  The existential restriction was represented using a combination of keywords.  For 
example, a paraphrase of „Pizza restriction (hasTopping someValuesFrom Tomato)‟ would 
be „any pizza which, amongst other things, has some tomato topping‟.  The inclusion of the 
phrase amongst other things recognises a user difficulty which will be further discussed in 
Sections 6 and 7.   
 
Difficulties of comprehension can arise when debugging ontologies.  After executing a 
reasoner, ontology developers may be confronted with an unexpected inference, or 
entailment.  Whilst such an inference will be a logical consequence of the ontology axioms, 
the developer may regard it as incorrect from the domain perspective.  Typically, ontology 
development systems can then be requested to provide a justification, defined as “a minimal 
subset of an ontology that is sufficient for an entailment to hold” (Horridge et al., 2011).  
However, understanding why the justification leads to the entailment can be difficult.  
Horridge et al. (2011) developed an intuitive model for the cognitive complexity of a 
justification and compared this with the difficulty actually experienced.  They did this by 
presenting study participants with some justifications and corresponding putative entailments, 
and asking participants to indicate whether the entailment was, or was not, valid.  They used 
the German DL syntax, with abstract names, e.g. C1, C2 for classes and prop1, prop2 for 
properties, which avoided participants making use of pre-existing domain knowledge.  Their 
model “fared reasonably well” in predicting which questions study participants would find 
difficult and which they would find easy. 
 
Nguyen et al. (2012) were interested in providing proof trees, in English, to explain why an 
entailment follows from a justification.  They identified 51 deduction steps which could be 
used to create the proof trees and tested out the comprehensibility of these deduction steps on 
study participants.  To do this, they presented a set of axioms and a putative inference and 
asked participants to confirm or refute the conclusion.  However, to prevent the influence of 
pre-existing domain knowledge, they used a combination of meaningless words 
(„kalamanthis‟, „tendriculos‟), meaningful words („plant‟, „animal‟) and also words which are 
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not real English but have a semblance of being real words („merfolk‟, „lizardfolk‟).  
Performance on these deduction rules varied widely.  The easiest achieved 100% correct 
responses; the most difficult 4%.  The latter required an understanding of the trivial 
satisfaction of the universal restriction. 
3 Human reasoning and human language 
 
This section describes the insights from reasoning studies and language studies which are 
used to guide and explain the work to be described later.   
 
3.1 Theories of reasoning 
 
Early theories of reasoning assumed “an unconscious logical calculus” which later was 
assumed to contain “formal rules of inference” (Johnson-Laird, 2010; page 194).  The 
expectation was that people reason using formal rules of logic, similar to those used by a 
trained logician.  These theories are variously referred to as sentential, rule-based (Stenning 
& Yule, 1997) or mental logic (Oaksford & Chater, 2001).  The phrase rule-based will be 
used here, to emphasize the difference from the model-based theory described later.   
 
An example of a rule-based theory is that developed by Rips (1983) for propositional 
reasoning.  The theory employs a set of logical rules.  Associated with each rule is an 
„availability parameter‟, representing the probability of being able to retrieve and use the rule.  
From these parameters, the probability of being able to construct a particular chain of 
reasoning can be calculated.  In his study, Rips presented participants with questions 
consisting of axioms and a putative inference.  Participants were required to indicate whether 
the inference was “necessarily true” or “not necessarily true”.  Based on the results of this 
experiment, Rips estimated the availability parameter for each of his rules. 
 
Braine (1978) provides another example of the rule-based theory applied to propositional 
logic.  His theory accepts that the rules of human reasoning may not always correspond to 
those used in standard logic.  For example, he argues that if p then q has a directionality, from 
p to q, in natural language which is absent from standard logic.  In everyday discourse we are 
not concerned with what happens when p is not true and would not normally associate a truth 
value with the statement when p is false.  Braine‟s (1978) natural propositional logic is based 
on the rules he claims we ordinarily use. 
 
However, people do not always reason entirely by the application of formal rules.  A classic 
early example of this is Wason‟s selection task (Wason, 1968), where participants are 
required to interpret rules in order to correctly select cards.  The model-based theory was 
developed to explain this and other experimental results.  The essence of this theory is that 
people construct mental models of reality and then require any inferences to be consistent 
with those models.  Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982) describe an early attempt to use mental 
models to explain experimental results relating to the layout of objects in two-dimensional 
space.  However, mental models can be used to represent more abstract situations.  
Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1999), for example, interpret relative difficulties with 
syllogisms in terms of mental model theory.  Johnson-Laird (2005) provides an overview of 
mental model theory, whilst Johnson-Laird (2004) puts the theory in its historical context, 
tracing it back to the work of the American logician C.S. Peirce, through Wittgenstein‟s 
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(1922) picture theory of meaning, and Craik‟s (1967) view that cognition is based on forming 
models of the world. 
 
As an example, consider conjunction, e.g. there is a circle and there is a triangle.  Using C 
and T to represent circle and triangle, this is represented by one mental model: 
 C T 
Exclusive disjunction, there is a circle or there is a triangle, but not both, requires two 
mental models: 
 C 
  T 
Inclusive disjunction, there is a circle or there is a triangle, or both, requires three mental 
models: 
 C T 
 C 
  T 
When dealing with a statement in propositional logic, the set of mental models corresponds to 
an expression in disjunctive normal form, with each mental model corresponding to a disjunct 
(Johnson-Laird et al., 1992).  The essence of the mental model theory is that, when there is a 
requirement for more than one mental model, human reasoners are apt to overlook one or 
more of the models.  This leads to the kinds of errors which humans frequently display.   
 
The distinction between the rule-based and mental model theories is analogous to that 
between syntactic and semantic approaches in logic.  Indeed, Braine and O‟Brien (1998) use 
the phrase “syntax of thought” when writing about their rule-based theory.  In contrast, 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, Prologue) use the phrase “an internal representation”. 
 
In addition to the rule-based and model-based theories, Halford et al. (1998) have developed 
a theory of reasoning based on ascribing a relational complexity (RC) to each reasoning step.   
They give the following example: John is taller than Mary and Mary is taller than Sue, 
leading to the inference John is taller than Sue.  This involves maintaining three items in 
working memory at the same time, and hence the RC is three.  Halford et al. (2005) found 
that there was no significant difference in accuracy or time between problems with RC two or 
three.  However, problems of RC four were answered significantly less accurately and in 
significantly longer time than problems of RC three.  Problems of RC five were not answered 
significantly better than chance.  RC theory can be regarded as complementary to both the 
other theories. 
 
3.2 The ambiguity of natural language 
 
MOS makes use of and and or to represent intersection and union.  This presumably arose 
because, if we take P(x) and Q(x) to be predicates representing membership of classes CP and 
CQ, then (P and Q)(x) represents membership of the intersection of those classes, whilst (P or 
Q)(x) represents membership of the union.  However, as already noted, DL, unlike FOL, is 
concerned with classes.  The following examples illustrate the ambiguity which arises when 
and and or are used to represent class operations.  The examples are taken from Partee and 
Rooth (1983); the analysis is the authors‟.  First consider three sentences constructed using 
and:  
1. Susan will retire and buy a farm. 
2. John and Mary are in Chicago. 
3. She was wearing a new and expensive dress. 
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(1) is clearly shorthand for the conjunction of two propositions: 
 (Susan will retire) and (Susan will buy a farm). 
 
(2) can also be interpreted as a conjunction: 
 (John is in Chicago) and (Mary is in Chicago). 
 
An alternative interpretation, which conveys the same meaning, is to regard and as 
representing union: 
 {John} ⋃ {Mary} are in Chicago. 
 
(3) can also be interpreted as a conjunction: 
 (She was wearing a new dress) and (she was wearing an expensive dress). 
 
However, here and can be regarded as representing intersection, again without any change of 
meaning: 
 She was wearing a {new dress} ⋂ {expensive dress}. 
 
In each of these three examples, the underlying semantics of and is the conjunction of two 
propositions.  However, in (2) and (3), an interpretation in terms of class operations may be 
more natural.  Moreover, it could be argued that union, rather than intersection, is a more 
natural interpretation of and, since intersection is often achieved by simply juxtaposing 
adjectives, e.g.: 
 She was wearing a new, expensive dress. 
 
(2) above used and to represent union.  The use of or to represent union, as in MOS, would 
clearly be wrong: 
 2A John or Mary is in Chicago. 
 
Here, or represents uncertainty, since 2A is shorthand for: 
 (John is in Chicago) or (Mary is in Chicago). 
 
However, Partee and Roth (1983) give another example: 
4. The department is looking for a phonologist or a phonetician. 
 
The underlying semantics of or is again disjunction: 
 (The department is looking for a phonologist) or (the department is looking for a 
phonetician). 
 
However, the sentence is ambiguous.  Interpreting as exclusive or implies uncertainty, i.e. 
that one of the above statements in brackets is true, but not both.  Interpreting as inclusive or 
allows the possibility that both statements can be true, and hence that the department may be 
looking for someone from either discipline: 
 The department is looking for {phonologist} ⋃ {phonetician}. 
 
In this last interpretation, or has the same meaning as in MOS.  
 
Mendonça et al. (1998) provide evidence that and and or give rise to ambiguities in practice.  
An examination of the use of and in preferred terms and synonyms in the SNOMED medical 
terminology, as used at that time, revealed that for 50.7% of the cases, both subjects were 
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required; for 46.1%, one or both; and for 3.2%, one or the other.  A similar analysis for or 
gave the breakdown: one or the other 50.2%; one or both 49.5%; both 0.3%.   
 
3.3 The implicature 
 
Grice (1975) has made the point that a speaker (or writer) may use language to convey ideas 
which are not logically implied by the words used but which nonetheless are understood by 
the listener (or reader).  Grice coined the word implicature for such ideas.  Braine (1978) 
observes that, in reasoning according to standard logic, it is necessary first to extract the 
“minimum commitments” from the premises, whereas “ordinary comprehension processes” 
make use of implicatures. 
 
Implicatures give rise to problems in the comprehension of MOS.  The most well-known of 
these is that only suggests the existence of at least one instance of the object, as discussed in 
section 2.3.  In everyday language, the sentence „John has only sons‟ is taken to imply that 
John does have sons.  In MOS, the statement has_child only male includes the possibility of 
no children at all.   
 
The effect of this implicature can be related to the mental model theory.  has_child only male 
is represented by two mental models: 
 
 has_child male 
 has child ⊥ 
 
In the second of these ⊥ represents Nothing, i.e. equivalent to the empty set.  It is this second 
model which is frequently overlooked, encouraged by the implicature associated with only. 
 
There are two possible implicatures surrounding the word some, depending on context.  The 
most commonly studied example is that some implies some not.  The idea here is that, if I say 
„some of the students are industrious‟ I wish to convey the idea that some are not; otherwise I 
would have said „all of the students are industrious‟.  However, there is another implicature 
which is relevant when considering the use of some in MOS.  If I am asked „does John have 
any children‟, and I reply „John has some sons‟, the listener would reasonably assume that he 
does not have any daughters.  Similarly, the MOS statement has_children some male may 
give rise to the assumption that there can be no female children.  As already noted in 
subsection 2.3, Rector et al. (2004) discussed the use of the phrase “amongst other things” in 
a paraphrase of the existential restriction, in order to mitigate this difficulty.   
 
The effect of this implicature can also be related to the mental model theory.  has_children 
some male is represented by two mental models: 
 
 has child male 
 has child male  has_child ¬male 
 
In the second of these, ¬ represents complement.  The danger is that this second model, 
representing the possibility that there is also a female child may get ignored, and this danger 
is encouraged by the implicature just discussed. 
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A final point to note is that the difficulty is exacerbated by the OWA.  If the CWA were 
adopted, the statement has_children some male, without a complementary has_children some 
female, would imply that there were only male children. 
4 Methodology 
 
The next three sections report three studies, all of which followed the same pattern.  There 
was an initial section which requested information about the participants, e.g. their 
knowledge of logic.  There were then three or four sections containing the questions.  Finally, 
there was a section which enabled the participants to provide feedback.  In the first study, the 
questions in each section were related to a particular ontology pattern; in the other two 
studies the questions in each section shared particular MOS features.  In all three studies, 
each question consisted of a set of axioms and a putative conclusion.  Participants were 
required to indicate whether the conclusion was valid or non-valid.  At the beginning of each 
study, participants were given a handout which explained all the languages features required 
to answer the questions.  They were able to read this handout before beginning the study and 
keep it for reference during the study.  In study 3, where there were two variants of the 
questions, two different handouts were used.  Participants were free to move through the 
studies at their own pace. 
 
In the first two studies, the SurveyExpression
6
 web tool was used to display the questions and 
record the responses.  Camtasia
7
 was run on the PC to record screen activity and the 
recordings were subsequently analysed to obtain timing data.  In the third study, for the 
reason explained in subsection 4.3, this set-up was replaced with the MediaLab application 
from Empirosoft
8
, which ran on the PC and recorded both the responses and the response 
times.  Statistical analysis was conducted using the R statistical package (R Core Team, 
2014). 
 
The participants were computer scientists or domain experts familiar with ontologies, drawn 
from university and industrial research laboratories.  More information about the background 
of the participants is provided in Warren et al. (2014; 2015; 2017). 
 
The following subsections consider some specific methodological issues. 
 
4.1 Avoiding the use of prior knowledge 
 
It is generally assumed, in studies of this kind, that one should avoid any bias due to prior 
knowledge.  Two approaches to this were discussed in subsection 2.3.  Horridge et al. (2011) 
used abstract names, whilst Nguyen et al. (2012) used „nonsense‟ statements combining 
made-up words and real words.  A third approach is to use a real ontology, but one which the 
participants are unlikely to have met, perhaps created specifically for the study.  An example 
is provided by Vigo et al. (2014), who use a potato ontology. 
 
The first of these approaches does not reflect the way ontologists normally work and may 
introduce difficulties of memorisation which are not relevant to the difficulties of reasoning 
being studied.  Moreover, the assumption that one should remove all bias due to prior 
                                                 
6
 www.surveyexpression.com 
7
 https://www.techsmith.com/camtasia.html 
8
 www.empirisoft.com 
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knowledge is questionable.  For example, it is likely that the user of an ontology has an 
inherent understanding of the characteristics of an object property, e.g. whether it is transitive 
or symmetric.  The Characteristics statement may serve to confirm any expectations, but is 
primarily for the benefit of the computer.  Johnson-Laird et al. (1989, page 668) make the 
same point when they argue that the logical properties of a term, e.g. the transitivity and 
symmetry of “is in the same place as” emerges “without any need to use explicit statements 
of these properties in the form of meaning postulates”.  Similarly, users may also be naturally 
aware of the subsumption relations in their domain, or this may be emphasized by the naming 
convention, rather than needing to refer to SubClassOf statements.   
 
The distinction needs to be made between the use of prior knowledge to arrive immediately at 
the correct response, without reasoning, which clearly needs to be avoided; and the use of 
prior knowledge which is normally available in the process of reasoning.  Laboratory 
experiments should create the most ecologically valid environment, e.g. through object 
property names reflecting the property characteristics and class names reflecting the 
hierarchical structure. 
 
Study 1 was based on published ontology patterns, and the names used were largely taken 
from those patterns.  In studies 2 and 3, names were chosen to achieve ecological validity: 
 In questions involving object properties with specific characteristics, the object property 
names are chosen to suggest those characteristics, e.g. greater_than_or_equal_to to 
suggest transitivity.  These names need to be chosen with great care to avoid suggesting 
additional characteristics which are not required, e.g. the use of has_sibling would have 
suggested transitivity, but would also have suggested symmetry.   
 In the questions where object properties were used to create restrictions, both the 
properties and the classes were given meaningful names.   
 In questions relating to Boolean operators, for simplicity abstract names were used.  
However, the use of several characters in somes name was designed to reinforce any class 
subsumption relations, e.g. X, X_1, X_1_A.  All class subsumptions were, of course, 
declared in the appropriate MOS statements. 
 For simplicity, individuals were given only single character names, e.g. a, b, c.  These 
names were used with the object properties greater_than_or_equal_to and 
has_nearest_neighbour, where the use of single names for individuals seemed consistent 
with practice in algebra and geometry. 
 
Study participants were, in fact, told only to draw on the information provided, and not make 
use of any preconceptions associated with names.  That this is not entirely possible was 
illustrated by a comment from a participant in study 2, who objected to the use of 
has_nearest_neighbour as a functional property, since a point may have more than one 
nearest neighbour.   
 
That meaningful names may aid reasoning is illustrated by an example from study 3.  In this 
study, a participant reported using the concept of „grandchild‟, not mentioned in the question, 
but deduced from the nested use of has_child. 
 
4.2 Statistical treatment 
 
In line with the recommended practice of the American Psychological Association (2010), p 
values are normally reported to three decimal places.  The standard convention is used that p 
< 0.05 is required for significance.  
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Significance, effect size and sample size are interrelated.  Van Schaik and Weston (2016) 
note the need for researchers “to choose a smallest important effect size”, i.e. the smallest 
effect size which is of interest.  Their approach includes the possibility of a result being 
“unclear”.  Alternatively, it is possible, given a minimum effect size of interest, to determine 
what sample size would be required to achieve a given statistical power.  Obtaining 
participants for studies such as these is difficult because of the requirement for prior 
background in computing or ontology development.  This has limited sample size, and hence 
quite large effects were required for significance.  This needs to be borne in mind when 
interpreting the results.   
 
In each of the three studies, the response time data was found to be positively skewed, as is 
illustrated in Figure 1 for the first study.  Statistical tests such as the t-test and ANOVA rely 
on the time distribution being approximately normal.  In the case of non-normal data, one 
possibility is to use non-parametric statistical tests.  However, Hopkins et al. (2009) note that 
a transformation to reduce skewness, followed by a parametric test provides greater statistical 
power at small sample size than does a non-parametric test.  One approach is to use a 
transformation selected from Tukey‟s ladder of powers (Scott, 2012).  Figure 2 shows that, 
for the study 1 response time data, choosing the log transformation from Tukey‟s ladder of 
powers reduces skewness and provides a distribution closer to normal. 
 
From the standpoint of statistical comparisons between questions, what is important is not the 
distribution overall, but the distribution of response time data within the individual questions.  
It was found that, for the majority of questions from the three studies, the optimum choice 
from the ladder of powers was the log transformation, and for consistency the log10 
transformation was used for all statistical tests where the response time data was required to 
be normal. 
 
 
Figure 1 Probability density function for question response time (secs) – study 1 
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         10          32         100 
Figure 2 Probability density function for question response time after log 
transformation (secs) – study 1 
 
4.3 Avoiding question order bias 
 
The first, exploratory study, contained three sections, and hence six permutations of section 
order.  There were twelve participants, and to compensate for any large-scale effect of 
question position, each section order was presented to two participants.  The second study 
contained four sections, and hence 24 permutations of section order.  There were 24 
participants
9
 and each section order was presented to one participant.  In addition, in study 2 
the questions in each section were presented in two reverse orders, with half the participants 
seeing the questions in one order and the other half seeing the alternative order.  As explained 
in section 6, there appeared to be a considerable time penalty for the first question in each 
section, which was not sufficiently compensated for by the reversal of question order.  This 
necessitated a careful choice of data for the statistical analysis.  To avoid this problem, in the 
third study the use of the MediaLab application enabled the order of the sections and the 
order of the questions within the sections to be randomized.  
5 Study 1 – investigating commonly used DL constructs 
 
The object of this study was to explore participants ability to reason with commonly used DL 
constructs in the context of commonly used patterns.  Warren et al. (2014) explain how the 
constructs and patterns were chosen, drawing on analyses by Power and Third (2010), Power 
(2010), Khan and Blomqvist (2010), and Warren et al. (2014).  The patterns used were: 
                                                 
9
 This refers specifically to the participants from whom response time data was collected.  As explained in 
section 6, there were four additional participants from whom only accuracy data was collected. 
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componency, coparticipation, and types of entity
10
.  The latter two were extended so that all 
the required DL constructs were included in the study.  Each pattern was the basis of a 
question section.  For each section, participants were shown the pattern before moving on to 
the questions.  The pattern was then repeated with each question, avoiding any need to 
memorise the pattern. 
 
As the study was exploratory, unlike the two subsequent studies there were no specific 
hypotheses. 
 
5.1 The componency pattern 
 
Figure 3 shows the componency pattern, whilst Table 2 shows the related questions with 
accuracy and response time data. 
 
 
Class Object   SubClassOf has_component only Object 
    SubClassOf is_component_of only Object 
Property has_part  Characteristics Transitive 
Property is_part_of  Characteristics Transitive 
    InverseOf has_part 
Property has_component SubPropertyOf has_part 
Property is_component_of SubPropertyOf is_part_of 
    InverseOf has_component 
 
Figure 3 Componency pattern 
 
  
                                                 
10
 Taken from the ODP portal: http://ontologydesignpatterns.org/wiki/Main_Page 
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Table 2 Componency pattern questions 
 
No. Question validity %age 
correct 
mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
1
*
 A is_part_of B; C is_part_of B  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
not-
valid 
100%
 
62.3  
(53.0) 
2
*
 A is_part_of B; B is_part_of C  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
valid 100% 20.3  
(9.7) 
3
*
 B is_part_of C; A is_part_of B  
⇒ A is_part_of C 
valid 100% 30.7  
(34.0) 
4 A has_component B 
B has_component C 
⇒ A has_component C 
not-
valid 
33% 62.8  
(36.2) 
5
*
 A has_component B 
B has_component C 
⇒ A has_part C 
valid 83% 29.0  
(15.8) 
6
*
 A has_component B 
B is_part_of C 
⇒ A has_part C 
not 
valid 
83% 57.9  
(31.0) 
7
* 
A has_component B 
C is_part_of B 
⇒ A has_part C 
valid 100% 37.4  
(37.7) 
8
* 
A Type Object 
A has_component B 
C Type not Object  
⇒ B DifferentFrom C 
valid 100% 49.9  
(18.4) 
9
* 
A Type Object; A has_part B 
C Type not Object  
⇒ B DifferentFrom C 
not 
valid 
83% 47.5  
(25.4) 
10
* 
A has_component B 
C is_component_of B 
⇒ C is_part_of A 
valid 100% 54.2  
(30.5) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
With the exception of question 4, all questions were answered significantly better than 
chance.  Question 4 was answered worse than chance, although not significantly so (p = 
0.194, Fisher‟s Exact Test, one-sided).  It appears that the participants who answered this 
question incorrectly have wrongly assumed that has_component is transitive.  The error may 
have arisen because has_component is a subproperty of has_part which is transitive, and 
participants may have assumed that transitivity is inherited; despite the handout stating that 
transitivity is not inherited.  In general, the inheritance of property characteristics cannot be 
assumed, although it is the case that some characteristics, e.g. functionality, are inherited.  
This issue is discussed further in Section 8, and in detail in Warren (2017; Chapter 2).  
Another factor may have been the everyday understanding of what it means to be a 
component, which conveys the implicature of transitivity.  This illustrates the importance of 
choice of names, e.g. has_direct_component might avoid this implicature.  
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5.2 The extended coparticipation pattern 
 
Figure 4 shows the extended coparticipation pattern, whilst Table 3 shows the related 
questions. 
 
 
Class Event   EquivalentTo has_participant some Object 
    DisjointWith Object 
Class Object   DisjointWith Event 
Class Player   SubClassOf Object 
Class Game   SubClassOf has_participant some Player 
Property coparticipates with Domain Object, Range Object 
    Characteristics Symmetric, Transitive 
Property has_participant         Domain Event, Range Object 
    InverseOf is_participant_in 
N.B. the statements in italics were added to the original pattern. 
 
Figure 4 Extended coparticipation pattern 
 
Table 3 Extended coparticipation pattern questions 
 
No. Question validity %age 
correct 
mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
1
* 
A coparticipates_with B  
⇒ A Type not Event 
valid 92%
 
54.9  
(35.5) 
2
* 
A is_participant_in B 
C coparticipates_with D  
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
not valid 92% 68.8  
(49.3) 
3
* 
A is_participant_in B 
C is_participant_in B 
⇒ A is participant in C 
not valid 100% 43.6  
(31.4) 
4
* 
A has_participant B 
C is_participant_in D 
⇒ B DifferentFrom D 
valid 92% 44.6  
(20.9) 
5
* 
B coparticipates_with A 
B coparticipates_with C 
⇒ C coparticipates with A 
valid 100% 34.8  
(15.9) 
6 A Type Game  
⇒ A Type Event 
valid 67% 47.6  
(25.6) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
All questions were answered better than chance; all significantly so except question 6 (p = 
0.194, Fisher‟s Exact Test, one-sided).  It is not clear why this question was answered less 
well than the others.  Possibly participants had difficulty with the existential restriction, 
although question 8 in the previous section involved the universal restriction and was 
answered well.  Reasoning with restrictions was investigated more thoroughly in the second 
study. 
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5.3 The extended types of entities pattern 
 
Figure 5 shows the extended types of entities pattern, whilst Table 4 shows the related 
questions. 
 
Class Entity   EquivalentTo Event or Abstract or Quality or Object 
Class Event   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Abstract, Quality, Object 
Class Abstract   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Quality, Object 
Class Quality   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Object 
Class Object   SubClassOf Entity 
    DisjointWith Event, Abstract, Quality 
Class Nonconceptual  EquivalentTo Event or Object 
Class Nontemporal  EquivalentTo Abstract or Quality or Object 
Property represents  Characteristic Functional 
N.B. the statements in italics were added to the original pattern. 
 
Figure 5 Extended types of entities pattern 
 
Table 4 Extended types of entities pattern questions 
 
No. Question validity %age 
correct 
mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
1
* 
A represents B; C represents D  
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
not valid 83%
 
91.5  
(61.7) 
2 A Type Entity 
A Type not (Event and Quality) 
⇒ A Type (Abstract or Object) 
not valid 25% 75.1  
(48.1) 
3 A represents B; C represents D 
B Type Object; D Type Event 
⇒ A DifferentFrom C 
valid 50% 75.8  
(31.0) 
4
* 
A Type Entity 
A Type not (Event or Quality) 
⇒ A Type Abstract or Object 
valid 92% 44.0  
(19.1) 
5 A Type (Nonconceptual and 
Nontemporal) 
⇒ A Type Object 
valid 75% 63.1  
(32.4) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05) 
 
Only two questions were answered significantly better than chance.  Question 2 was 
answered worse than chance, although not significantly so (p = 0.073, Fisher‟s Exact Test, 
one-sided) and question 3 was answered at chance.  These two questions are now considered 
in detail. 
 
5.3.1 Negated intersection – question 2 
 
Question 2 involves negated intersection.  This question was answered significantly less 
accurately than question 4 which involved negated union (p = 0.003, Fisher‟s Exact Test, 
two-sided).  Khemlani et al. (2012), working with naïve reasoners, found that 18% correctly 
answered questions relating to negated conjunction, whereas 89% correctly answered 
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questions relating to negated disjunction.  These results are explicable in terms of mental 
model theory.  Interpreting A and B as propositions or classes appropriately, then negated 
disjunction and negated union require one mental model: 
 
¬A ¬B 
 
Negated conjunction and negated intersection require three mental models: 
 
¬A ¬B 
¬A 
¬B 
 
It is possible that some people only create the first of these mental models, i.e. equivalent to 
the single mental model representing negated union. 
 
5.3.2 Functional object property – question 3 
 
Question 3 requires first an understanding that, since B and D are in disjoint classes (i.e. 
Object and Event), they must be different entities.  It follows from the functionality of 
represents, that A and C must also be different entities.  It may be that participants find it 
difficult to reason about functionality.  However, this is a complex question; the final 
reasoning step is of RC 4, since it involves the entities A, B, C, D.  It is not clear, therefore, to 
what extent the difficulty is due to an inherent difficulty of functionality and to what extent it 
is due to the complexity of the question. 
 
5.4 Effect of participants’ background knowledge 
 
Participants were asked to rate their knowledge of formal logic, and of OWL or another DL 
formalism.  In both cases they were provided with the scale: „no knowledge‟; „a little 
knowledge‟; „some knowledge‟; „expert knowledge‟.  No participants rated themselves in the 
first category for either logic or DL.  Table 5 shows the breakdown of responses between the 
other three categories, along with the percentage correct and the mean time to complete the 
study; the latter includes the time spent reading the on-screen preamble for the study overall 
and for each section. 
 
Table 5 Participant performance by knowledge of formal logic, and by knowledge of OWL or 
another DL formalism 
 Knowledge of logic  Knowledge of OWL or other DL formalism 
 no. 
participants 
percentage 
correct 
mean (s.d.) 
time - secs 
 no. 
participants 
percentage 
correct 
mean (s.d.) 
time - secs 
A little 
knowledge 
2 64% 1935 (968)  3 78% 2289 (384) 
some 
knowledge 
8 87% 1762 (796)  5 81% 1771 (922) 
expert 
knowledge 
2 88% 1107 (346)  4 90% 1113 (254) 
 
 As can be seen, there was increasing performance and decreasing time with increased 
knowledge both of formal logic and DL.  There was a significant Spearman‟s rank correlation 
between knowledge of formal logic and accuracy of response (ρ = 0.53, p = 0.038, one-sided 
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test)
11
 and between knowledge of DL and accuracy (ρ = 0.54, p = 0.036, one-sided test).  
There was also a significant Spearman‟s rank correlation between knowledge of DL and total 
time to answer the questions (ρ = -0.65, p = 0.011, one-sided test).  However, the Spearman‟s 
rank correlation between knowledge of formal logic and total time was not significant (ρ = -
0.29, p = 0.178).  Here, the small number of participants in two of the categories makes 
reliable analysis difficult.  It is also the case that there was a significant correlation for these 
participants between knowledge of formal logic and knowledge of DL (ρ = 0.58, p = 0.024, 
one-sided test) and this needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the data.  More detail is 
given in Warren (2017, Chapter 6). 
 
5.5 Conclusions from study 1 
 
This first study identified four particular difficulties in reasoning with MOS: 
1. an apparent assumption that transitivity is inherited by subproperties; 
2. with existential restriction, in a situation which also involved the manipulation of 
subclasses; 
3. in reasoning with negated intersection; 
4. with a functional object property, in a situation of RC 4. 
 
There was also evidence that increasing knowledge of formal logic and DL led to increasing 
accuracy and that knowledge of DL led to decreasing time to perform the study. 
6 Study 2 – controlled comparisons 
 
The second study built on the first, exploratory study, by using controlled comparisons 
between questions to further investigate participant difficulties.  These comparisons enabled a 
better understanding, both of the effect of different DL constructs and also of increasing 
complexity. 
 
6.1 Study 2 – practical details 
 
The study followed the format described in Section 4.  Response time data was collected 
from 24 participants, and accuracy data was collected from these 24 participants plus 4 
additional participants.  This arose because, on four occasions there were problems which led 
to a failure to collect all the response time data.  Thus response time analysis was based on a 
sample of 24, accuracy analysis on a sample of 28. 
 
There was no evidence that section position significantly affected accuracy (χ2(3) = 3.1119, p 
= 0.375)
12
.  Moreover, there was no evidence that the position of a question within its section 
significantly affected accuracy (χ2(9) = 11.8586, p = 0.221)12.   
 
For response time, an ANOVA did reveal that there was a significant dependence of time on 
section position (F(3,812) = 4.82, p = 0.002).  However, this should be compensated for by 
the use of every permutation of section position.  A regression analysis of log response time 
against position of question within section also indicated a significant dependence (F(1,814) 
                                                 
11
 In this and subsequent usages of Spearman‟s rank correlation in this paper, the p-value could not be calculated 
exactly because of ties.  It is assumed that this does not materially affect the results. 
12
 This analysis was performed on data from 24 participants, representing each possible permutation of section 
order. 
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= 77.76, p < 0.001).  This might be expected to be partially compensated by the use of the 
two reversed question orders, as discussed in section 4.4.  However, inspection of the data 
revealed that there was an appreciable time premium for the first, and sometimes the second, 
question in each section.  To avoid any bias this might introduce, where necessary analysis 
was conducted using subsets of the data. 
 
6.2 Functional object properties 
 
In study 1 participants had difficulty with a question involving a functional object property.  
This question section compares reasoning about functionality with reasoning about 
transitivity and investigates the effect of question complexity in reasoning about 
functionality.  Only the former is reported here.  The latter is reported in Warren et al. (2015). 
 
6.2.1 Questions 
 
Subsection 5.3.2 noted the difficulty which some participants had in the first study with a 
question involving a functional property.  It was not clear to what extent the difficulty arose 
from the complexity of the question, and to what extent it was inherent in the concept of a 
functional property.  To understand this better, this study undertook a comparison of 
questions involving functionality and transitivity, under conditions of controlled complexity.   
 
The question in study 1 required a reasoning step of the form: 
 
 a F b; c F d; b DifferentFrom d ⇒ a DifferentFrom c  (1) 
 
Here, F is a functional object property and a, b, c and d are individuals.  This step has RC 4 
because it requires the concurrent attention to four individuals. 
 
Another inference involving functionality is: 
 
 a F b; a F c ⇒ b SameAs c      (2) 
 
This step has RC 3 because it only requires the concurrent attention to three individuals.  If 
there is no inherent difference in difficulty between functionality and transitivity, then we 
might expect this reasoning step to display the same difficulty as the following one, where T 
represents a transitive object property: 
 
 a T b; b T c ⇒ a T c      (3) 
 
This also has RC 3 because it requires the concurrent attention to three individuals. 
 
The two RC 3 inferences in (2) and (3) form the basis of a comparison between functionality 
and transitivity.  Since these two inferences are individually relatively easy, it was thought 
that human reasoners might perform so well on them both as to make discrimination difficult.  
Therefore, an inference was used which involves functionality and requires two applications 
of the RC 3 reasoning step: 
 
 a F b; a F c; b F d; c F e ⇒ d SameAs e   (4) 
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This requires two reasoning steps of RC 3, linked by an additional reasoning step of RC 2 in 
which c is substituted for b in b F d, or b is substituted for c in c F e. 
 
For comparison, an inference involving a transitive object property, T, also with reasoning 
steps of RC 3, 2 and 3, was constructed: 
 
 a T b; b T c; c SameAs d; d T e ⇒ a T e   (5) 
 
Here the axiom c SameAs d is used to necessitate a reasoning step of RC 2, analogous to the 
one which arises naturally in (4).  Inference (5) is the basis of questions 1 and 2 in this 
section.  Question 1 employs the correct, valid conclusion.  Question 2 has a non-valid 
conclusion.  Similarly, inference (4) is the basis of questions 3, with a valid conclusion, and 
question 4, with a non-valid conclusion.  The remaining four questions in this section use a 
functional object property.  Questions 5 and 6 replace the final reasoning step of (5) with a 
step of RC 4; questions 7 and 8 then replace the first reasoning step with one of RC 4.  Note 
that correctly answering the questions containing functional properties requires an 
understanding of the OWA, specifically that different names may or may not refer to the 
same individual.  Table 6 shows all eight questions, along with the accuracy and timing data.  
In the table, T and F are used to represent the object properties.  In the actual questions 
greater_than_or_equal_to was used for transitivity and has_nearest_neighbour for 
functionality.  For brevity this table, and all subsequent such tables, omit the declaration 
statements, e.g. property and individual declarations.  These statements were included in the 
questions.  As already explained, the questions were presented in two different orders.  One 
group (1) of participants saw the questions in the order: 2, 3, 5, 8, 1, 4, 6, 7.  The other group 
(2) saw the questions in the reverse order: 7, 6, 4, 1, 8, 5, 3, 2.  The data for the two groups is 
also shown in the table. 
 
Table 6 Questions employing transitivity and functional object properties 
 
No. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid / 
non-
valid 
RC %age corr mean time (s.d.) – secs 
overall 
N = 28 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
overall 
N = 24 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1* a T b; b T c;  
c SameAs d; d T e 
a T e valid 3,2,3 96% 100% 92% 34  
(14) 
28  
(11) 
40 
(14) 
2* d T b non-
valid 
n/a 86% 87% 85% 48  
(34) 
47 
(16) 
49 
(47) 
3* a F b; a F c;  
b F d; c F e 
d SameAs e valid 3,2,3 75% 67% 85% 52  
(36) 
49 
(33) 
54 
(39) 
4* a SameAs e non-
valid 
n/a 96% 100% 92% 61  
(46) 
42 
(26) 
79 
(56) 
5 a F b; a F c;  
d F b; e F f;  
c DifferentFrom f 
d DifferentFrom e valid 3,2,4 61% 47% 77% 84  
(67) 
80 
(79) 
88 
(55) 
6* a DifferentFrom d non-
valid 
n/a 79% 73% 85% 92  
(66) 
73 
(65) 
111 
(64) 
7 a F b; c F d;  
b Differentfrom d;  
e F a; f F g;  
c SameAs g 
e DifferentFrom f valid 4,2,4 43% 40% 46% 109  
(79) 
86 
(69) 
132 
(85) 
8* a DifferentFrom f non-
valid 
n/a 71% 73% 69% 96  
(47) 
91 
(47) 
101 
(48) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05); N = 28 
 
Questions 1 to 4 enabled the investigation of the hypothesis: 
 
H2.1 Reasoning about functionality is inherently more difficult than reasoning 
about transitivity, after controlling for complexity. 
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6.2.2 Functionality versus transitivity – hypothesis H2.1 
 
Comparison of questions 1 and 2 with questions 3 and 4 enables a comparison of the relative 
difficulty of transitivity and functionality.  Considering first accuracy, Table 5 shows that, the 
transitive valid question was answered more accurately than the functional valid question, 
although not significantly (p = 0.051, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided).  Considering the non-
valid questions, the situation was reversed with the functional question being answered more 
accurately than the transitive question, although again not significantly (p = 0.352, Fisher‟s 
Exact Test, two-sided). 
 
Considering response time, the transitive valid question was answered significantly faster 
than the functional valid question (t(23) = 3.0843, p = 0.005, paired test, two-sided).  The 
transitive non-valid question was answered faster than the functional non-valid question, but 
not significantly (t(23) = 1.262, p = 0.220, paired test, two-sided). 
 
6.3 Complement, intersection and union 
 
Study 1 showed that people have more difficulty with complemented intersection than with 
complemented union.  The questions in this section were designed primarily to investigate the 
effect of alternative syntactic representations on reasoning with complemented intersection.  
This is discussed in detail in this section.  Additionally, the questions looked at the effect of 
expanding complemented union, i.e. replacing not (A or B) with not A and not B; and with the 
effect of increasing complexity.  These latter two effects are discussed in Warren et al. 
(2015). 
 
6.3.1 Questions 
 
In order to ground the questions in an ecologically valid context, they were based on Rector‟s 
(2003) use of Boolean operators to define exceptions in OWL.  The questions are shown in 
Table 7.  The table shows the minimum number of reasoning steps, and the maximum RC of 
these steps, for each of the valid questions.  The table also shows the mental models 
associated with each set of axioms, giving both an initial form derived from the first axiom 
and then a form taking account of the subsequent axioms defining disjoint unions.  In the 
representation of the mental models, tc is a representative member of TOP_CLASS, whilst a, 
b, c, a1, a1x, a1y are members of A, B, C, A_1, A_1_X, A_1_Y respectively.  Questions 1 and 
2, 3 to 8, and 9 and 10 have semantically equivalent axioms and the same mental models.   
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Table 7 Questions employing complement, union and intersection 
 
no. axioms putative 
conclusion 
valid /  
not-
valid 
no. 
steps 
(RC) 
mental 
model(s) 
1 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not A  
 and not B) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
Z EquivalentTo C valid 3 
(3) 
tc ¬a ¬b 
 
≡ 
c 2 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A or B)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B, C 
valid 2 
(3) 
  
3 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and  
 not (A and not A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A1, A2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 5 
(3) 
tc ¬a 
tc a1 
 
≡ 
 
b 
a1 
4 Z EquivalentTo B not-
valid 
n/a 
5 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS  
 and (not A or A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 3 
(2) 
6 Z EquivalentTo 
A_1 
not-
valid 
n/a 
7 Z EquivalentTo ((TOP_CLASS and not A) or 
 (TOP_CLASS and A_1)) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1) 
valid 5 
(3) 
8 Z EquivalentTo 
A_2 
not-
valid 
n/a 
  
9 Z EquivalentTo (TOP_CLASS and not (A and not 
 (A_1 and not A_1_X))) 
TOP_CLASS DisjointUnionOf A, B 
A DisjointUnionOf A_1, A_2 
A_1 DisjointUnionOf A_1_X, A_1_Y 
Z EquivalentTo 
(B or A_1_Y) 
valid 9 
(4) 
tc ¬a 
tc a1 ¬a1x 
≡ 
b 
a1y 
10 Z EquivalentTo 
A_1_Y 
not-
valid 
n/a 
 
One group (1) of participants saw the questions in the order: 3, 1, 8, 10, 5, 6, 9, 7, 2, 4.  The 
other group (2) saw the questions in the reverse order: 4, 2, 7, 9, 6, 5, 10, 8, 1, 3.  Table 8 
shows the accuracy and response time data. 
 
Table 8 Questions employing complement, union and intersection 
- accuracy and response time data 
 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age correct mean time (s.d.) – secs 
overall 
N = 28 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
overall 
N = 24 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1
*
 valid 82% 80% 85% 39 (26) 49 (31) 30 (15) 
2
*
 valid 86% 100% 69% 43 (29) 22 (11) 64 (26) 
 
3 valid 61% 60% 62% 96 (56) 128 (57) 63 (31) 
4 non-valid 64% 53% 77% 105 (78) 42 (17) 167 (62) 
5 valid 64% 67% 62% 65 (38) 60 (33) 69 (43) 
6
*
 non-valid 79% 80% 77% 58 (33) 36 (16) 79 (32) 
7
*
 valid 68% 80% 54% 70 (45) 39 (13) 101 (44) 
8
*
 non-valid 89% 93% 85% 65 (26) 67 (29) 63 (24) 
 
9 valid 54% 60% 46% 90 (48) 71 (31) 110 (56) 
10
*
 non-valid 68% 60% 77% 94 (47) 94 (44) 95 (51) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05); N = 28 
 
Questions 3, 5 and 7 have semantically equivalent but syntactically different axioms and the 
same putative conclusion.  This provides an opportunity to investigate the effect of syntax: 
 
H2.2 Reasoning is influenced by syntax, in situations of semantic equivalence. 
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6.3.2 Effect of syntax – hypothesis H2.2 
 
Inspection of questions 3, 5 and 7 shows a small amount of variation in accuracy.  Question 
3, the unexpanded form employing complemented intersection, was the least accurately 
answered.  However, there was no significant difference between the questions (χ2(2) = 
0.31111, p = 0.856). 
 
Analysis of the response time data for questions 3, 5 and 7 needs to take account of the fact 
that question 3 was answered first by half the participants, and this appears to have attracted a 
considerable time penalty.  Consequently, the statistical analysis was restricted to data for 
which questions 3, 5 and 7 occurred in the second half of the section (N = 12).  On this basis, 
an ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the three questions (F(2,33) = 2.0891, 
p = 0.140). 
 
A caveat is required here.  This does not imply that syntactic form never makes a difference; 
simply that there was no significant difference for these particular questions.  As will be 
shown in subsection 6.4.2, there are situations in which performance differs significantly 
between two semantically equivalent but syntactically different questions.  
 
6.4 Complement and restrictions 
 
This section is concerned with investigating the existential and universal restrictions, 
including interaction with complement.  In particular, it enables an investigation of the effect 
of syntax and semantics on reasoning with these types of constructs. 
 
6.4.1 Questions 
 
Table 9 shows the questions, all of which have the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y.  
Consider first questions 1 to 4.  They share the same second axiom, which uses the universal 
restriction to constrain the class Y.  For the first axiom, which constrains class X, questions 1 
and 2 have the complement immediately before the named class (MALE), whilst questions 3 
and 4 have the complement immediately before the anonymous class formed from the object 
property has_child and a restriction.  Thus, all four possible variants of type of restriction (i.e. 
existential and universal) and position of complement are used.  The first axioms of questions 
1 and 4 are semantically equivalent, as are the first axioms of questions 2 and 3.  To 
emphasise this equivalence, the first axioms of questions 1 and 4 are shown in distinctive 
typeface, and the first axioms of questions 2 and 3 in normal typeface.  The semantic 
equivalence is based on the duality relations for restrictions.  These are represented in MOS, 
where R is an object property and C is a class, as: 
 
R some not C ≡  not R only C 
 
R only not C ≡  not R some C 
 
Questions 5 to 8 repeat the first axioms from the first four questions, and share a second 
axiom which uses the existential restriction to constrain the class Y.   
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Table 9 Questions employing existential and universal restrictions, and complement 
 
No. First axiom  
– constraining X 
Second axiom  
– constraining Y 
valid / 
non-valid 
1 X SubClassOf has_child some 
(not MALE) 
 
Y SubClassOf 
has_child only MALE 
valid 
2 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) non-valid 
3 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) non-valid 
4 X SubClassOf not (has_child 
only MALE) 
valid 
5 X SubClassOf has_child some 
(not MALE) 
 
Y SubClassOf 
has_child some MALE 
non-valid 
6 X SubClassOf has_child only (not MALE) valid 
7 X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE) valid 
8 X SubClassOf not (has_child 
only MALE) 
non-valid 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: X DisjointTo Y 
 
One group (1) of participants saw the questions in the order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.  The other 
group (2) saw the questions in the reverse order: 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1.  Table 10 shows the 
accuracy and response time data. 
 
Table 10 Questions employing existential and universal restrictions, and complement 
- accuracy and response time data 
 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age corr mean time (s.d.) – secs 
overall  
N = 28 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
overall 
N = 24 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1 valid 61% 53% 69% 52 (39) 70 (44) 34 (25) 
2 non-valid 50% 47% 54% 33 (18) 28 (12) 39 (22) 
3* non-valid 68% 67% 69% 45 (22) 43 (17) 47 (27) 
4* valid 75% 73% 77% 43 (25) 48 (28) 39 (22) 
5 non-valid 64% 60% 69% 41 (30) 48 (36) 33 (22) 
6 valid 50% 40% 62% 44 (40) 43 (49) 46 (30) 
7* valid 79% 80% 77% 43 (37) 32 (21) 54 (46) 
8* non-valid 68% 73% 62% 60 (37) 41 (28) 78 (37) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05); N = 28 
 
The fact that the first axioms fall into two groups of semantically equivalent axioms, 
combined with the two alternatives for the second axiom, means that the questions fall into 
four pairs of semantically equivalent questions: {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {5, 8}, {6, 7}.   
 
6.4.2 Syntax versus semantics – H2.2 
 
Inspection of Table 10 shows that, with the exceptions of questions 5 and 8, within each pair 
of semantically equivalent questions there is an appreciable difference in accuracy.  Indeed, 
in the case of questions 6 and 7 the difference is significant (p = 0.0496, Fisher‟s Exact Test, 
two-sided).  Thus it appears that syntax has here an appreciable effect on performance.  A 
more detailed inspection of the data gives some insight into what determines performance.  In 
questions 4 and 7, the questions which were answered most accurately, the first axiom uses 
the complement of the anonymous class used in the second axiom.  Since complementary 
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classes are disjoint, X and Y, being subclasses of the two anonymous classes, will also be 
disjoint.  Thus, it is immediately clear from the syntax that the conclusion is valid, without 
the need to construct detailed mental models.   
 
In the other questions, the conclusion is not so obvious from the syntax, and more thought is 
required.  In questions 2 there may also be confusion between has_child only (not MALE) and 
not (has_child only MALE).  If the latter were substituted for the former, then the participant 
would erroneously conclude that the conclusion is valid.  A similar comment applies to 
question 5, where has_child some (not MALE) may be confused with not (has_child some 
MALE).  Indeed, Rector et al. (2004) have noted this source of confusion. 
 
Question 2 also suffers from the difficulty that it requires an understanding of the trivial 
satisfaction of the universal restriction; another difficulty pointed out by Rector et al. (2004).  
In terms of mental model theory, this is equivalent to ignoring the second mental model in the 
representation of the universal restriction. 
 
A final point to note is that, if participants had been aware of the duality relations shown in 
subsection 6.4.1, questions 1 and 6 would have been considerably easier, since they can be 
transformed into questions 4 and 7, the most accurately answered questions.  Knowledge of 
these relations might also have guarded against the confusion of only not with not … only and 
some not with not … some, as may have occurred in questions 2 and 5. 
 
6.5 Nested restrictions 
 
This section is concerned with further investigation of the difficulties of reasoning with the 
existential and universal restrictions.  An additional difficulty is introduced here by the use of 
nested restrictions, i.e. the object of one restriction is a class defined by a second restriction.  
The next subsection describes the questions, and the following two subsections discuss the 
results for the valid and non-valid questions. 
 
6.5.1 Questions 
 
Table 11 shows the questions.  In the second column, there are axioms constraining the class 
X.  For half the questions one axiom is used, containing two restrictions.  For the other 
questions, two axioms are used connected by a named class, Y.  As a consequence, the first 
axiom for question 1 is equivalent to the first two axioms for question 5.  A similar relation 
holds between questions 2, 3, 4 and 6, 7, 8.  Questions 1 to 4 use all the patterns some … 
some, some … only, only … some, and only … only and questions 5 to 8 repeat these patterns. 
 
The third column then shows the remaining two axioms which are used to constrain an 
individual a.  Questions 1 to 4 use some not, whilst questions 5 to 8 use not … some.  All the 
questions have the same putative conclusion: a Type (not X). 
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Table 11 Questions with nested restrictions 
 
No. First axiom(s)  
– constraining X 
Remaining axioms  
– constraining a 
valid / 
non-valid 
1 X SubClassOf (has_child some  
(has_child some FEMALE)) 
a has_child b; 
b Type has_child some 
(not FEMALE) 
non-valid 
2 X SubClassOf has_child some Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child only FEMALE 
non-valid 
3 X SubClassOf (has_child only  
(has_child some FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
4 X SubClassOf has_child only Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child only FEMALE 
valid 
5 X SubClassOf has_child some Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child some FEMALE 
a has_child b; 
b Type (not (has_child 
some FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
6 X SubClassOf (has_child some  
(has_child only FEMALE) 
non-valid 
7 X SubClassOf has_child only Y; 
Y EquivalentTo has_child some FEMALE 
valid 
8 X SubClassOf (has_child only 
(has_child only FEMALE)) 
non-valid 
N.B.  All questions have the same putative conclusion: a Type (not X) 
 
One group (1) of participants saw the questions in the order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 7, 6, 5.  The other 
group (2) saw the questions in the reverse order: 5, 6, 7, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1.  Table 12 shows the 
accuracy and response time data. 
 
Table 12 Questions with nested restrictions – accuracy and response time data 
 
No. valid / 
non-valid 
%age corr mean time (s.d.) – secs 
overall 
N = 28 
order 1 
N = 15 
order 2 
N = 13 
overall 
N = 24 
order 1 
N = 12 
order 2 
N = 12 
1
*
 non-valid 71% 73% 69% 69 (45) 96 (45) 41 (23) 
2 non-valid 57% 67% 46% 79 (53) 96 (56) 62 (46) 
3
*
 non-valid 71% 73% 69% 63 (43) 71 (41) 56 (45) 
4 valid 57% 67% 46% 63 (39) 55 (43) 71 (36) 
5 non-valid 54% 47% 62% 88 (62) 47 (28) 128 (60) 
6 non-valid 64% 73% 54%
 
73 (45) 51 (34) 95 (44) 
7
*
 valid 71% 87% 54% 80 (36) 62 (36) 98 (26) 
8 non-valid 50% 53% 46% 55 (30) 41 (22) 68 (32) 
* answered significantly better than chance (p < 0.05); N = 28 
 
This section appears to be more difficult than the section with restrictions discussed in 
subsection 6.4.  The overall accuracy for this section was 62%, and that for the previous 
section was 64%, although the difference was not significant (p = 0.695, Fisher‟s Exact Test, 
two-sided).  However, the mean response time for this section was 71 seconds, compared 
with 45 seconds for the previous section, and this difference was significant (F(1,382) = 
47.868, p < 0.001). 
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6.5.2 Questions with valid putative conclusions 
 
There were two questions with valid putative conclusions: questions 4 and 7.  Question 7 was 
one of the three questions answered significantly better than chance.  It is clear from the 
syntax that the anonymous class defined in the final axiom, i.e. not (has_child some 
FEMALE), is the complement of Y.  This immediately implies that b cannot be in Y, and 
hence, given the use of the universal restriction in the first axiom, that a cannot be in X.  This 
contrasts with question 4, which was answered less well.  Here there is no such syntactic clue 
and participants are likely to find it more difficult to realise that b cannot be in Y and hence 
that a cannot be in X.  Whilst for both questions the mean time to answer correctly was less 
than the mean time to answer incorrectly, the difference was only significant for question 7 
(question 7: t(16.932) = 3.11, p = 0.006; question 4: t(13.235) = 0.14744, p = 0.885).  This 
suggests that participants who answered question 7 correctly picked up the syntactic clue 
quickly.  Note that if the final axiom of question 4 was transformed using the appropriate 
duality rule, to b Type not (has_child only FEMALE), then this question would offer a 
syntactic clue, analogous to question 7. 
 
6.5.3 Questions with non-valid putative conclusions 
 
The remaining six questions all had non-valid conclusions.  The best answered were 
questions 1 and 3.  In both questions, the first axiom states that a member of the anonymous 
class formed with the second restriction has a female child and the final axiom states that b 
has a non-female child.  There is no contradiction here, although it does require an awareness 
of the second mental model in the representation of the existential restriction.  In both 
questions, having deduced that b can be in the anonymous class formed by the second 
restriction of the first axiom, it is clear that a can be in X. 
 
Question 6 was also answered relatively well.  The non-validity of the conclusion can be 
deduced in two ways.  It is possible for b to be in the anonymous class formed with the 
second restriction in the first axiom, although this does require an understanding that the 
universal restriction can be trivially satisfied, i.e. it requires an understanding of the second 
model in the representation of the universal restriction.  Although this was pointed out in the 
handout, participants might easily overlook this and revert to the more natural sense of only, 
with the implicature that a female child does exist.  However, even if participants conclude 
wrongly that b cannot be in Y, it is still possible for a to be in X by having another child 
which does have a female child.  This also requires an awareness of the second model in the 
expansion of the existential restriction.  A participant who initially takes the first model for 
the first (existential) restriction, and then fails to take note of the second model for the second 
(universal) restriction, can still answer the question correctly by backtracking to the first 
restriction and taking the second model for this restriction. 
 
In question 5 there is a strong syntactic clue that b cannot be in Y; not (has_child some 
FEMALE) is clearly the complement of has_child some FEMALE.  To answer the question 
correctly, it is essential to backtrack to the first restriction and use its second model to 
understand that it is possible for a to be in X by having another child which itself does have a 
female child.  A similar argument applies to question 2.  It is relatively easy to see that b 
cannot be in Y, since b cannot have only female children and some non-female children.  
Again, to understand the non-validity of the conclusion it is essential to backtrack to the 
second model for the first restriction. 
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Finally, question 8 has similarities with question 6.  It is possible for b to be in the 
anonymous class formed with the second restriction in the first axiom, and hence a in X, since 
there is no contradiction in logic between having only female children and having no children 
at all.  However, unlike with question 6, if participants fail to understand this, backtracking to 
the first (universal) restriction offers no second chance.  The second model in the 
interpretation of the first universal restriction is not applicable, since this would require that a 
has no children, and we know that a has_child b.  So, although question 6 can be correctly 
answered by making use of the trivial satisfaction of the universal restriction, this knowledge 
is not essential.  Only question 8 requires that knowledge for a correct answer. 
 
6.6 Effect of participants’ background knowledge 
 
As with the previous study, participants were asked to rate their knowledge of formal logic 
and of OWL or another DL formalism.  Table 13 shows the breakdown of participants, along 
with the mean accuracy and time in each category.  A Spearman‟s rank correlation revealed 
no significant correlation between accuracy and knowledge of logic (ρ = 0.19, p = 0.163, one-
sided), although there was a significant correlation between accuracy and knowledge of DL 
(ρ = 0.41, p = 0.015, one-sided).  There was no significant correlation between time and 
knowledge of logic (ρ = -0.13, p = 0.266, one-sided) or knowledge of DL (ρ = -0.29, p = 
0.087).   
 
Table 13 Participant performance by knowledge of formal logic, and by knowledge of OWL 
or another DL formalism 
 Knowledge of formal logic  Knowledge of OWL or another DL 
formalism 
  accuracy  time  accuracy  time 
 N %age 
correct 
 N mean time  
(s.d.) - secs 
 N %age 
correct 
 N mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
No 
knowledge 
2 51% 
 
1 
2484 
(NA) 
 3 72% 
 2 2545 
(429) 
A little 
knowledge 
3 80% 
 
3 
2087 
(217) 
 8 58% 
 7 2573 
(871) 
some 
knowledge 
16 65% 
 
14 
2522 
(816) 
 9 67% 
 7 2401 
(776) 
expert 
knowledge 
7 77% 
 
6 
1929 
(768) 
 8 80% 
 8 1965 
(700) 
 
6.7 Conclusions from study 2 
 
Table 14 summarises the findings from study 2.  The study identified that reasoning about 
functionality can take longer than reasoning about transitivity, after controlling for 
complexity.  The study has further investigated difficulties with the universal and existential 
restrictions.  In some cases, the difficulties appeared to stem from a failure to take account of 
both the mental models for these restrictions.  This has been well known for the universal 
restriction, but also appears true for the existential restriction. 
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Table 14 Summary of study 2 findings 
 
Hypothesis Accuracy Response time 
H2.1 Functionality harder 
than transitivity 
No significant effect. Valid transitive question 
answered significantly faster 
than valid functional 
question. 
H2.2 Reasoning 
performance is influenced 
by syntax 
No significant effect for 
Boolean constructors.  
Significant difference 
between semantically 
equivalent but syntactically 
different forms involving 
restrictions. 
No significant effect for 
Boolean constructors.  For 
questions involving 
restrictions, no clear 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
 
Two general comments are appropriate.  Firstly, reasoning with DL statements is very 
difficult.  15 of the 34 questions were not answered significantly better than chance.  
Secondly, participants appeared to use both semantic and syntactic approaches to reasoning.   
 
Finally, prior knowledge had less effect on performance than was the case in the first study.  
Overall, the questions in the second study were harder than those in the first study, and this 
may be the reason for the reduced effect. 
7 Study 3 – modifying the syntax 
 
The previous two studies identified some of the difficulties which people experience when 
reasoning with DLs, in particular using MOS.  This section looks at how extensions to the 
MOS vocabulary can mitigate those difficulties.  These effects were evaluated by using 
questions isomorphic to some of those from the previous two studies.  This enabled 
comparisons with the previous questions, chiefly with those in study 2.   
 
In this study, as explained in Section 4, the MediaLab software was used, on the 
experimenter‟s computer, to pose the questions and to record the responses and response 
times.  This enabled the section and question order to be randomized, to avoid any bias 
arising from question order.  There were 30 participants and the study existed in two variants.  
Some, but not all, of the questions differed in the two variants. Participants were allocated 
alternately between the two variants.   
 
Subsections 7.1 to 7.4 describe the four parts of the study.  These are parallel to those in 
study 2, being concerned with: functional and inverse functional object properties; 
complement, union and intersection; complement and restrictions; and nested restrictions.  
Finally, subsection 7.5 draws some conclusions. 
 
7.1 Functional and inverse functional object properties 
 
Study 2 demonstrated that valid questions employing functional object properties took 
significantly longer than valid questions employing transitive object properties.  At least one 
participant in a previous study had appeared to be confused between functionality and inverse 
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functionality, i.e. to be unclear whether it was the subject or object of the property which was 
unique.  It was hypothesized that the introduction of an additional keyword, solely, before the 
object would emphasize that it is the object which is unique and facilitate reasoning.  This 
leads to the hypothesis: 
 
H3.1 The introduction of the additional keyword solely between a functional object 
property and its object will improve participant performance. 
 
Neither of the previous studies employed inverse functional object properties.  It was thought 
that reasoning with such properties was likely to display the same kind of difficulties as 
reasoning with functional object properties; and hypothesized that the use of the keyword 
solely, this time before the subject, would aid reasoning.  This led to the hypothesis: 
 
H3.2 The introduction of the additional keyword solely before the subject of an 
inverse functional property will improve participant performance. 
 
Two questions were designed using inverse functional properties.  As there were no questions 
from previous studies with which to make a comparison, half the participants saw these 
questions in standard MOS, the other half saw the questions with the inclusion of solely.  
 
7.1.1 Functional object properties – hypothesis H3.1 
 
Table 15 shows the six study 3 questions using functional object properties.  For these 
questions, there was no difference between the two variants of the study, i.e. all participants 
saw the same questions.  In the table, F is used for brevity to represent the object property.  
As with study 2, in the actual questions, has_nearest_neighbour was used.  These questions 
are isomorphic to questions 3 to 8 in Table 6, differing only in the use of different individual 
names and the use of the keyword solely. 
 
Table 15 Questions employing functional object properties 
 
 axioms (F = has_nearest_neighbour) putative 
conclusion 
validity relational 
complexity 
1 r F solely s; r F solely t;  
s F solely v; t F solely w 
v sameAs w valid 3,2,3 
2 r sameAs t not valid n/a 
3 r F solely s; r F solely t; v F solely s;  
w F solely x; t DifferentFrom x 
v DifferentFrom w valid 3,2,4 
4 r DifferentFrom v not valid n/a 
5 r F solely s; t F solely v;  
s DifferentFrom v;  
w F solely r; x F solely z; t SameAs z 
w DifferentFrom x valid 4,2,4 
6 r DifferentFrom x not valid n/a 
 
Table 16 shows the accuracy and response time data for the six questions.  In each case, the 
comparable data from study 2 is also shown.  For the six questions aggregated, the accuracy 
in study 3 was 76%, compared with 71% in study 2; this difference was not significant (p = 
0.334, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided).  Comparison of the two studies shows that for each of 
the valid questions the accuracy was greater in study 3 than in study 2.  This suggests 
comparing the three valid questions aggregated, for which the accuracy in study 3 was 72% 
compared with 60% in study 2.  However, again the difference was not significant (p = 0.081, 
Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided). 
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Table 16 Questions employing functional object properties  
– accuracy and response time data* 
 study 2 – without solely 
from Table 6 
study 3 – with solely 
%age 
correct  
N = 28 
mean time (SD) – 
secs 
N = 24 
%age 
correct  
N = 30 
mean time (SD) 
– secs 
N = 30 
1 75% 52 (36) 83% 39 (31) 
2 96% 61 (46) 83% 50 (29) 
3 61% 84 (67) 70% 58 (27) 
4 79% 92 (66) 83% 78 (49) 
5 43% 109 (79) 63% 73 (37) 
6 71% 96 (47) 70% 90 (46) 
All questions  71% 83 (61) 76% 65 (41) 
valid questions 60% 81 (67) 72% 57 (35) 
non-valid questions 82% 83 (55) 79% 73 (45) 
 
* These questions are numbered as in study 3; the analogous questions in study 2 were 
numbered from 3 to 8. 
 
Comparison of the response times in Table 16 shows that, for each question, the mean 
response time for study 3 was less than for study 2.  For each pair of questions of equivalent 
complexity, this difference was greater for the valid question.  When the valid questions were 
aggregated, the difference between the two studies was significant (t(144.7) = 2.8373, p = 
0.005).  For the non-valid questions, the difference was not significant (t(148.61) = 1.0043, p 
= 0.317)
13
. 
 
7.1.2 Inverse functional object properties – hypothesis H3.2 
 
Table 17 shows questions 7 and 8, which were used to investigate the effect of solely in the 
case of inverse functional object properties.  Variant 1 uses conventional MOS.  Variant 2 is 
identical except for the use of solely before the subject of each object property.  In the table, I 
is used to represent the object property.  In the actual questions, is_nearest_neighbour_of was 
used. 
 
Table 17 – Questions employing inverse functional object properties 
 
 axioms (I = is_nearest_neighbour_of) putative conclusion validity relational 
complexity 
variant 1 
7 r I s; t I s; v I r; w I t v SameAs w valid 3,2,3 
8 r I s; t I v; r DifferentFrom t; 
s I w; x I z; v SameAs x 
w DifferentFrom z valid 4,2,4 
variant 2 
7 solely r I s; solely t I s;  
solely v I r; solely w I t 
v SameAs w valid 3,2,3 
8 solely r I s; solely t I v;  
r DifferentFrom t; solely s I w; 
w DifferentFrom z valid 4,2,4 
                                                 
13
 A caveat applies here.  In these comparisons, for both studies we are using six questions out of a total of eight 
in the section.  For study 2 the lack of randomization in the question order could introduce a bias.  However, this 
is unlikely to be appreciable.  The same caveat applies to other comparisons in Section 7. 
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solely x I z; v SameAs x 
 
Table 18 shows the accuracy and response time data for these questions.  For question 7, the 
accuracy for variant 2 was greater, but not significantly so (p = 0.651, Fisher‟s Exact Test, 
two-way).  For question 8, the percentage of correct responses was the same in both variants.   
 
For question 7, the response time was greater for variant 2 than for variant 1.  For question 8, 
the response time was less for variant 2.  However, in neither case was the difference 
significant (question 7: t(26.423) = 1.2631, p = 0.218; question 8: t(19.906) = 0.57643, p = 
0.571).  
 
Table 18 – Questions employing inverse functional object properties 
- accuracy and response time data 
 
 variant 1 – without solely; N = 15 variant 2 – with solely; N = 15 
% corr mean time (SD) - secs % corr mean time (SD) - secs 
question 7  73% 38 (18) 87% 48 (23) 
question 8 73% 105 (92) 73% 90 (43) 
 
7.2 Complement, intersection and union 
 
Study 1 noted the difficulty experienced with complemented intersection.  Subsection 5.3.1 
suggested that this might be the result of a failure to create all three of the mental models 
required.  This failure could, in part, be caused by the ambiguity surrounding the word and, 
as discussed in subsection 3.2.  It was hypothesized that the use of the keyword intersection 
would reduce this problem: 
 
H3.3 The use of the keyword intersection in place of and will improve participant 
performance for complemented intersection. 
 
A number of the questions in study 2 made use of and not to create exceptions.  It was 
hypothesized that the use of the keyword except would improve reasoning: 
 
H3.4 The use of except in place of and not will improve participant performance. 
 
Table 19 shows the questions for variant 1, which were used to investigate these two 
hypotheses.  H3.3 was investigated by comparing question 1 in variant 1 with a comparable 
question in study 1, specifically question 2 in Table 4.  For consistency, or was replaced with 
union, and the effect of this change was investigated by comparing question 2 in variant 1 
with question 4 in Table 4.  In study 1, both these questions were based on an ontology 
pattern.  For study 3 the essential features of the questions have been extracted out to make 
them standalone. 
 
H3.4 was investigated by comparing questions 3 to 8 with comparable questions from study 
2, specifically, questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10 in Table 7.  These questions were chosen to 
represent all three levels of complexity.  In Table 7 there are six questions of medium 
complexity; questions 3 and 4 in Table 7 were chosen to generate questions for this study 
because these questions made the greatest use of and not.  As in the previous section, the 
names of the entities were changed. 
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Table 19 Boolean concept constructor questions – variant 1 
 
 V / NV axioms putative conclusion 
Derived from study 1 
1 NV UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf W, X, Y, Z; 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not (W intersection Y); 
a Type (X union Z) 
2 
 
V UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf W, X, Y, Z; 
a Type UNIVERSE; a Type not (W union Y); 
a Type (X union Z) 
Derived from study 2 
3 V W EquivalentTo ((UNIVERSE except X) except Y); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y, Z 
W EquivalentTo Z 
4 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X union Y)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y, Z 
W EquivalentTo Z 
5 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X except X_1)); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y; 
X DisjointUnionOf X_1, X_2 
W EquivalentTo (Y 
union X_1) 
6 NV As for question 5 W EquivalentTo Y 
7 V W EquivalentTo (UNIVERSE except (X except (X_1 
except X_1_A))); 
UNIVERSE DisjointUnionOf X, Y; 
X DisjointUnionOf X_1, X_2; 
X_1 DisjointUnionOf X_1_A, X_1_B 
W EquivalentTo (Y 
union X_1_B) 
8 NV As for question 7 W EquivalentTo X_1_B 
 
 
MOS uses infix notation for intersection and union.  However, earlier DL syntaxes used 
prefix notation.  Variant 2 uses prefix notation to enable a comparison between infix and 
prefix.  This is discussed in Warren et al. (2017), where it is shown that there was no 
significant difference between the two approaches.  A caveat needs to be stated here.  The 
participants were almost all experienced in various aspects of computer science, as is 
demonstrated by the data in subsection 7.5.  It may be that the infix notation, familiar from 
everyday language, would be of value to domain experts with limited experience of computer 
science. 
 
Table 20 shows the accuracy and response time data for questions 1 and 2, and Table 21 
shows the data for questions 3 to 8.  For comparison, the relevant data from the previous two 
studies are also shown. 
 
Table 20 Boolean concept constructor questions – study 3: questions 1 and 2 
 
study 1 
from Table 4 
study 3 
 variant 1 variant 2 
 % age 
correct 
 
N = 12 
mean resp. time 
(s.d) - secs 
 
N = 12 
% age 
correct 
 
N = 15 
mean resp. 
time (s.d) - 
secs 
N = 15 
% age 
correct 
 
N = 15 
mean resp. 
time (s.d) - 
secs 
N = 15 
2 25% 75 (48) 1 80% 53 (41) 67% 47 (16) 
4 92% 44 (19) 2 87% 42 (28) 100% 39 (25) 
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Table 21 Boolean concept constructor questions – study 3: questions 3 to 8 
 
study 2 
from Table 8 
study 3 
 variant 1 variant 2 
 % age 
correct 
 
 
N = 28 
mean resp. time 
(s.d) – secs 
 
 
N = 24 
% age 
correct 
 
 
N = 15 
mean 
resp. time 
(s.d) – 
secs 
N = 15 
% age 
correct 
 
 
N = 15 
mean 
resp. time 
(s.d) – 
secs 
N = 15 
1 82% 39 (26) 3 100% 39 (25) 100% 47 (30) 
2 86% 43 (29) 4 100% 35 (26) 93% 46 (35) 
3 61% 96 (56) 5 53% 61 (37) 53% 65 (38) 
4 64% 105 (78) 6 100% 44 (25) 73% 82 (57) 
9 54% 90 (48) 7 60% 97 (75) 40% 156 (126) 
10 68% 94 (47) 8 80% 88 (60) 60% 93 (51) 
Mean 69% 78 (56) Mean 82% 61 (50) 70% 82 (74) 
 
7.2.1 Replacing and with intersection – hypothesis H3.3 
 
To investigate the effect of replacing and with intersection, a comparison was made between 
question 2 of study 1 and question 1 of study 3, variant 1.  The latter was answered 
significantly more accurately than the former (p = 0.007, Fisher Exact Test, two-sided).  
However, there was no significant difference in response time (t(23.988) = 1.6031, p = 
0.122). 
 
A comparison of question 4 of study 1 with question 2 of study 3 variant 1 revealed that the 
replacement of or with union made no significant difference to accuracy (p = 1, Fisher Exact 
Test, two-sided).  This is to be expected given the high proportion of correct responses for 
this question in study 2.  Nor was there any significant difference in response time (t(24.433) 
= 0.5372, p = 0.596).   
 
7.2.2 Replacing and not with except – hypothesis H3.4 
 
To investigate the effect of replacing and not with except a comparison needs to be made 
between questions 3 to 8 of variant 1 in study 3 and the corresponding questions in study 2.  
Inspection of Table 21 indicates that, taking the aggregate for these questions, variant 1 of 
study 3 was answered more accurately than the study 2 questions. This difference was 
significant (p = 0.026, Fisher Exact Test, two-sided).  When the aggregated response times 
are compared, the study 3 variant 1 questions can be seen to be answered significantly faster 
(t(201.95) = 2.4906, p = 0.014).   
 
7.3 Complement and restrictions 
 
Subsection 6.4 described the difficulties which study 2 participants experienced with the 
universal and existential restrictions, and related these difficulties in part to a failure to form 
both the required mental models.  Alternative keywords to only and some might draw 
attention to the less dominant mental model and improve participant performance.  In 
particular, it was hypothesized that: 
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H3.5 The use of noneOrOnly in place of only and including in place of some will 
lead to improved participant performance. 
 
In addition, in study 2, some questions included the construct not <object property> some, 
e.g. two questions in Table 9 included the axiom X SubClassOf not (has_child some MALE).  
However,  not … some is not a natural English construct; a more natural construct is not … 
any.  The use of the latter construct might aid comprehension and reasoning.  This leads to 
the hypothesis: 
 
H3.6 The use of any to indicate the existential restriction, when the corresponding 
object property is preceded by a complement, will improve performance. 
 
To test these hypotheses, the questions from Table 9 involving complement and restrictions 
were modified as in Table 22.  Variant 1 was constructed by substituting noneOrOnly for 
only and including for some.  Variant 2 was constructed similarly, except that not … any was 
substituted for not … some; note that this only affects questions 3 and 7.  Table 23 shows the 
accuracy and mean response times for the questions, and for the comparable questions in 
study 2. 
 
Table 22 Complement and restriction questions 
 
 first axiom second axiom validity 
1 A SubClassOf has_child including 
(not FEMALE) 
B SubClassOf 
has_child 
noneOrOnly 
FEMALE 
valid 
2 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly (not FEMALE) not 
valid 
3 variant 1 not 
valid A SubClassOf not (has_child including FEMALE ) 
variant 2 
A SubClassOf not (has_child any FEMALE ) 
4 A SubClassOf not (has_child 
noneOrOnly FEMALE) 
valid 
5 A SubClassOf has_child including 
(not FEMALE) 
B SubClassOf 
has_child 
including 
FEMALE 
not 
valid 
6 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly (not FEMALE) valid 
7 variant 1 valid 
A SubClassOf not (has_child including FEMALE ) 
variant 2 
A SubClassOf not (has_child any FEMALE ) 
8 A SubClassOf not (has_child 
noneOrOnly FEMALE) 
not 
valid 
N.B. the putative conclusion in each case was A DisjointWith B. 
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Table 23 Complement and restriction questions – accuracy and response times 
 study 2 
from Table 10 
study 3 
both variants 
study 3 
variant 1 
study 3 
variant 2 
only, some noneOrOnly, including 
 not ... including not ... any 
%age 
correct 
 
 
 
N = 28 
mean 
resp. 
time 
(s.d.) -
secs 
N = 24 
%age 
correct 
 
 
 
N = 30 
mean 
resp. 
time 
(s.d.) -
secs 
N = 30 
%age 
correct 
 
 
 
N = 15 
mean 
resp. 
time 
(s.d.) -
secs 
N = 15 
%age 
correct 
 
 
 
N = 15 
mean 
resp. time 
(s.d.) -
secs 
 
N = 15 
1 61% 52 (39) 80% 42 (33)     
2 50% 33 (18) 73% 29 (20)     
3 68% 45 (22) 70% 69 (127) 67% 55 (49) 73% 84 (175) 
4 75% 43 (25) 90% 41 (32)     
5 64% 41 (30) 70% 30 (21)     
6 50% 44 (40) 70% 33 (33)     
7 79% 43 (37) 80% 29 (16) 73% 26 (14) 87% 33 (18) 
8 68% 60 (37) 67% 38 (24)     
Exc Q3 and Q7 61% 45 (33) 75% 35 (28)     
Q3 and Q7 73% 44 (30) 75% 49 (92) 70% 40 (38) 80% 58 (125) 
 
7.3.1 noneOrOnly  and including – hypothesis H3.5 
 
To avoid the confounding effect of the use of not … any for questions 3 and 7 in variant 2, a 
comparison of studies 2 and 3 used the remaining six questions.  For these six questions, 
using data from variant 1 and variant 2, study 3 questions were answered significantly more 
accurately than study 2 questions (p = 0.008, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided) and also 
significantly more quickly (t(284.57) = 2.7897, p = 0.006).   
 
7.3.2 not … any – hypothesis H3.6 
 
It is not possible to compare the effect of using not … some in study 2 with not … any in 
study 3, variant 2, because of the confounding effect of the use of noneOrOnly or including in 
the second axiom.  Therefore, the comparison made here is between not … including in study 
3 variant 1 and not … any in variant 2.  Table 23 shows that, for questions 3 and 7 the 
accuracy was greater for variant 2, which used not … any.  However, the difference was not 
significant (p = 0.552, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided).  Table 23 shows that, for these two 
questions, the response time was greater for variant 2.  However, again this difference was 
not significant (t(57.832) = 0.79496, p = 0.430).  
 
7.4 Nested restrictions 
 
The questions in study 2 with nested restrictions offer another opportunity to investigate 
hypotheses H3.5 and H3.6.  Table 24 shows the analogous questions used in variant 1 of 
study 3, where only has been replaced with noneOrOnly and some with including.  
Comparison of variant 1 with study 2 enables the further investigation of H3.5.  For variant 2, 
only and some have also been replaced with noneOrOnly and including; except that for 
questions 5 to 8, in the final axiom not … any is used in place of not … including.  This 
enables a further investigation of hypothesis H3.6. 
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Table 24 Nested restriction questions – study 3; variant 1 
 
 first axiom(s) final axiom valid 
1 A SubClassOf (has_child including (has_child including 
MALE)) 
x has_child y; 
y Type has_child 
including (not 
MALE) 
not valid 
2 A SubClassOf has_child including B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child noneOrOnly MALE 
not valid 
3 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child including 
MALE)) 
not valid 
4 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child noneOrOnly MALE 
valid 
5 A SubClassOf has_child including B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
x has_child y; 
y Type (not 
(has_child 
including 
MALE)) 
not valid 
6 A SubClassOf (has_child including (noneOrOnly MALE)) not valid 
7 A SubClassOf has_child noneOrOnly B; 
B EquivalentTo has_child including MALE 
valid 
8 A SubClassOf (has_child noneOrOnly (has_child 
noneOrOnly MALE)) 
not valid 
N.B. the putative conclusion in each case was x Type (not A). 
 
The final hypothesis is not directly concerned with the main theme of this study, but 
nevertheless is concerned with how MOS can best be written to aid comprehension.  
Inspection of the response time data for this section in study 2 suggested that participants 
were taking longer overall to answer those questions which employed a named class to link 
the first two axioms, compared with those questions where the first axiom included two 
restrictions.  However, the fact that the two formats were used for different questions made a 
rigorous comparison impossible.  As can be seen from Table 24, in study 3 variant 1 used the 
same format as study 2; enabling a proper investigation of hypotheses H3.5.  Questions 5 to 8 
of variant 2 also used the same format as study 2, and hence of variant 1, enabling a proper 
investigation of hypothesis H3.6.  However, questions 1 to 4 of variant 2 used the alternative 
format to study 2 and variant 1.  For example, question 1 in variant 1 (Table 24) used an 
anonymous class, whereas question 1 of variant 2 (not shown) used a named class.  
Conversely, question 2 of variant 1 used a named class; whereas question 2 of variant 2 used 
an anonymous class.  This enabled a comparison between the two formats and an 
investigation of the hypothesis: 
 
H3.7 There will be a difference in reasoning performance between the equivalent 
use of a named class and an anonymous class. 
 
Table 25 shows the accuracy and mean response times for both variants of study 3, and for 
comparison repeats the data from study 2 shown in Table 12.  Note that the aggregate data for 
variant 2 is not shown.  The use of not … including in questions 1 to 4 and not … any in 
questions 5 to 8 has the consequence that the aggregate data for variant 2 are not useful for 
comparison. 
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Table 25 Nested restriction questions – accuracy and response time 
 
 study 2 
from Table 12 
study 3 
var 1 
study 3 
var 2 
 only, some noneOrOnly, including 
 % age 
correct 
N = 28 
mean resp. 
time (s.d.) 
– secs 
N = 24 
% age 
correct 
 
N = 15 
mean resp. 
time (s.d.) 
– secs 
N = 15 
% age 
correct 
 
N = 15 
mean resp. 
time (s.d.) 
– secs 
N = 15 
1 71% 69 (45) 80% 47 (30) 60% 73 (59) 
2 57% 79 (53) 40% 65 (20) 67% 68 (41) 
3 71% 63 (43) 60% 54 (31) 53% 79 (46) 
4 57% 63 (39) 53% 100(87) 47% 66 (49) 
     not ... any  
5 54% 88 (62) 40% 64 (30) 67% 74 (67) 
6 64% 73 (45) 73% 85 (82) 73% 99 (90) 
7 71% 80 (36) 53% 64 (39) 47% 97(102) 
8 50% 55 (30) 60% 83 (35) 53% 63 (37) 
Mean for Q5 to 8 60% 74 (46) 57% 74 (51) 60% 83 (77) 
Mean for all questions 62% 71 (45) 58% 70 (51)   
 
 
7.4.1 noneOrOnly and including – hypothesis H3.5 
 
To investigate the effect of replacing some and only with including and noneOrOnly requires 
a comparison of study 3 variant 1 with the analogous section in study 2.  Inspection of Table 
25 shows that the overall accuracy for the former was actually less than for the latter, 
although the difference was not significant (p = 0.420, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-sided).  There 
was also no significant difference in response times (t(288.79) = 0.40724, p = 0.684).  This 
contrasts with the results of subsection 7.3.1 where, for those questions, there was a 
significant effect on accuracy and response time. 
 
7.4.2 not … any – hypothesis H3.6 
 
To investigate the effect of replacing not … including with not … any requires a comparison 
of questions 5 to 8 in the two variants of study 3.  Inspection of Table 25 shows that, 
considering questions 5 to 8, the overall accuracy was slightly greater for variant 2 than 
variant 1, although the difference was not significant (p = 0.853, Fisher‟s Exact Test, two-
sided).  There was also no significant difference in response times (t(106.86) = 0.19408, p = 
0.847).  This result is consistent with that of subsection 7.3.2. 
 
7.4.3 named versus anonymous classes – hypothesis H3.7 
 
Table 26 shows the data from questions 1 to 4, aggregated over the questions using a named 
class and over the questions where the named class was replaced with an anonymous class.  
Note that each participant answered two of the four questions with a named class and the 
other two with an anonymous class. 
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Table 26 Named and anonymous classes – percentage correct and response times 
 
named class; N = 15 anonymous class; N = 15 
% corr mean time (s.d.) 
- secs 
% corr mean time (s.d.) 
- secs 
52% 79 (58) 63% 59 (39) 
 
Inspection of Table 26 shows that the questions using an anonymous class were answered 
more accurately.  However, the difference was not significant (p = 0.268, Fisher Exact Test, 
two-sided).  The questions using an anonymous class were answered more quickly than the 
questions using a named class, and in this case the difference was significant (t(117.99) = 
2.5387, p = 0.012). 
 
It is only possible to speculate on what causes this significant difference in response times.  
Possibly, where two statements are used, with a named class in common, two mental models 
are formed, which then have to be merged.  Whereas, where one statement is used, with the 
named class being replaced by an anonymous class, then one mental model is created as the 
statement is being parsed.  Another possibility is that storing and retrieving the name, and 
information associated with the name, takes more cognitive effort and hence time.  It may be 
that the use of a meaningless name increases this effect, and that a meaningful name (e.g. 
parentOfSomeMale) would reduce the effect. 
 
7.5 Effect of participants’ background knowledge 
 
As in the previous studies, participants were asked to rate their knowledge of formal logic 
and of OWL or another DL formalism.  For this study there is the additional complication 
that difference between the two variants may act as a confounding factor.  Hence, each 
variant has been treated separately.  Table 27 shows, for each variant, how the respondents 
divided between the various categories of knowledge of logic, with the mean accuracy and 
time in each category.  Table 28 provides similar information for knowledge of OWL or 
another DL formalism.  Inspection of both tables suggest, prima facie, that knowledge of 
logic and knowledge of DL both correlate with increased accuracy and reduced time.  
However, there are only three significant results.  In variant 1, knowledge of formal logic 
correlates significantly with speed of answering the questions.  In variant 2, knowledge of 
logic and knowledge of DL formalism both correlate significantly with accuracy.   
 
Table 27 Participant performance by knowledge of formal logic 
  Variant 1  Variant 2 
 N %age 
correct 
mean time  
(s.d.) - secs 
 N %age 
correct 
mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
No knowledge 1 69% 2722 (NA)  0 NA NA (NA) 
A little knowledge 3 60% 2484 (859)  4 59% 2463 (526) 
some knowledge 9 75% 1911 (374)  5 74% 2571 (697) 
expert knowledge 2 73% 1524 (26)  6 79% 2043 (525) 
Spearman‟s rank 
correlation (one-sided) 
   
ρ = 0.362 
p = 0.092 
ρ = -0.661 
p = 0.004 
     
ρ = 0.585 
p = 0.011 
ρ = -0.277 
p = 0.159 
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Table 28 Participant performance by knowledge of OWL or another DL formalism 
   Variant 1  Variant 2 
 N %age 
correct 
mean time  
(s.d.) - secs 
 N %age 
correct 
mean time 
(s.d.) - secs 
No knowledge 3 82% 2077 (607)  1 66% 3073 (NA) 
A little knowledge 6 66% 2116 (703)  8 68% 2391 (592) 
some knowledge 5 69% 1997 (444)  3 70% 2339 (539) 
expert knowledge 1 81% 1506 (NA)  3 89% 1913 (660) 
Spearman‟s rank 
correlation (one-sided) 
   
ρ = -0.187 
p = 0.748
14
 
ρ = -0.223 
p = 0.212 
     
ρ = 0.483 
p = 0.034 
ρ = -0.350 
p = 0.101 
 
An additional question is whether knowledge of formal logic or DL has a different effect on 
the different sections, which might require different kinds of expertise.  To investigate this in 
the case of accuracy, a logistic analysis of deviance was undertaken.  Four factors were used: 
knowledge of logic, knowledge of DL, section, and variant.  The last factor was included 
because, as can be seen from Tables 27 and 28, the distribution of expertise was different for 
the two variants.  Effects due to differences in expertise need to be separated from effects due 
to difference between the variants.  The analysis included the effect of pairwise interactions.  
A difficulty with such an analysis is that, because the data is unbalanced, the results of the 
analysis of deviance will depend upon the order of specification of the factors.  The analysis 
was executed in the order: knowledge of logic, knowledge of DL, section and variant; and 
also with knowledge of logic and knowledge of DL interchanged.  In both cases, the two 
kinds of expertise and the section were significant (p < 0.001 for all three factors).  However, 
neither the variant nor any of the pairwise interactions was significant (p > 0.1 in all cases). 
 
A parallel analysis of variance applied to the log(time) data revealed a more complex 
situation.  When the factor knowledge of logic preceded knowledge of DL, then the time was 
significantly dependent on knowledge of logic (p = 0.031), section (p = 3.25 x 10
-8
), variant 
(p = 0.015), but not knowledge of DL (p = 0.665).  There were two interaction effects: 
between knowledge of logic and variant (p = 0.036) and knowledge of DL and variant (p = 
0.013).  When the order of knowledge of logic and DL was interchanged, neither of these two 
factors were significant.  The only significant factors were: section (p = 3.25 x 10
-8
), variant 
(p = 0.015), and the interaction between knowledge of logic and variant (p = 0.000717).  In 
neither case was there any significant interaction between prior knowledge and section. 
 
To summarise, it appears that prior knowledge is beneficial, and that such knowledge does 
not differentially affect the different sections. 
 
7.6 Conclusions from study 3 
 
Table 29 summarises the findings from study 3.  The study demonstrated that the use of a 
different, or in one case an additional, keyword could significantly affect performance.  The 
use of solely to indicate the direction of uniqueness with functional properties significantly 
reduced response time for the valid questions, although it had no significant effect for inverse 
functional properties.  In one question section, described in section 7.3, the replacement of 
some and only with including and noneOrOnly significantly increased accuracy and 
significantly reduced response time.  However, in the section with nested restrictions, 
                                                 
14
 Note that the correlation coefficient is, counter-intuitively, negative.  However, as with other correlations 
between knowledge and accuracy, the p-value has been calculated on the prior assumption of a positive 
correlation. 
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described in section 7.4, these changes made no significant difference, neither to accuracy nor 
response time.  In study 2 the nested restrictions questions were answered significantly more 
slowly than the other section involving restrictions.  It may be that these questions are too 
difficult for most participants to answer correctly, whatever keywords are used.   
 
Table 29 Summary of study 3 findings 
 
 accuracy response time 
H3.1 Use of solely in 
functional object property. 
No significant effect. Significantly reduced 
response time for the valid 
questions. 
H3.2 Use of solely in inverse 
functional object property. 
No significant effect. No significant effect. 
H3.3 Use of intersection in 
place of and with 
complemented intersection. 
Significant increase in 
accuracy. 
No significant effect. 
H3.4 Use of except in place 
of and not. 
Significantly increased 
accuracy. 
Significantly reduced 
response time. 
H3.5 Use of noneOrOnly in 
place of only and including 
in place of some. 
Significant increase in 
accuracy for questions 
without nested restrictions, 
but no significant effect for 
questions with nested 
restrictions. 
Significant reduction in 
response time for questions 
without nested restrictions, 
but no significant effect for 
questions with nested 
restrictions. 
H3.6 Use of not … any in 
place of not … some. 
No significant effect. No significant effect. 
H3.7 Use of a named class 
versus an anonymous class. 
No significant effect. Reasoning with anonymous 
class significantly faster 
than with named class. 
 
8 Implications and future work 
 
This section considers some of the implications of the work and proposes some future 
research directions.  Subsection 8.1 makes some proposals for improving the comprehension 
of DLs.  Subsection 8.2 discusses the role of theory.  Subsection 8.3 looks at the role of 
natural language and also the relationship between FOL and DLs.  Subsection 8.4 discusses 
some future research directions and subsection 8.5 makes some final comments. 
 
8.1 Proposals 
 
These studies lead to proposals in three areas: training; support systems; and the syntax of 
MOS.  
 
8.1.1 Training 
 
There are four areas in particular which require emphasis in training.  Firstly, it needs to be 
made clear that property characteristics are not necessarily inherited by subproperties.  The 
most effective way to do this may be to provide examples where inheritance fails.  For 
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example, siblingOf is symmetric, but its two subproperties brotherOf and sisterOf are not; 
descendantOf is transitive, but sonOf and daughterOf are not.  For more advanced students, it 
may be desirable to explain which characteristics are inherited, and why.  The difference 
between inherited and non-inherited characteristics is discussed in Warren (2017; Chapter 
2)
15
.   
 
Secondly, the difference between functional and inverse functional properties needs to be 
stressed, so that students are clear that in the former case it is the object which is unique, and 
in the latter case it is the subject.  For functional properties, the analogy with elementary 
mathematics may be helpful.  f(x) always evaluates to one number, although f(x) = k may 
have several solutions.  Inverse functional properties can then be considered as the reverse of 
functional. 
 
Thirdly, attention needs to be given to De Morgan‟s laws.  The rule is that, when the 
complement moves inside or outside the brackets, then the operator switches between 
intersection and union.  This can be illustrated with the use of Venn diagrams. 
 
Fourthly, related duality laws for restrictions need to be introduced.  The rule is analogous to 
that for De Morgan‟s laws.  When the complement moves inside or outside the restriction, 
then the restriction switches between existential and universal.  A diagrammatic approach can 
be used to illustrate this.  Figure 6 illustrates that some and only not are complementary, and 
hence that of not … some and only not are equivalent.  Alternatively, the rule can be 
illustrated by analogy with the following, or similar, sentences: 
(1) John has some non-male children. 
(2) John does not have some male children. 
(3) John has only non-male children. 
(4) John does not have only male children. 
At first glance one might think that (1) is equivalent to (2).  They both use some and the 
negation has simply been moved to a different place in the sentence.  Similarly, one might 
think that (3) is equivalent to (4).  More careful thought reveals that (1) is equivalent to (4) 
and (2) is equivalent to (3), where the latter equivalence takes into account the possibility that 
John has no children at all. 
  
                                                 
15
 In brief, the distinction is between a characteristic which implies the validity of a property relationship and a 
characteristic which implies the falsehood of a property relationship.  For example, compare a symmetric 
property, S, and an asymmetric property, A.  For the former, we have: 
 a S b ⇒ b S a 
For the latter we have: 
 a A b ⇒ ¬ b A a 
 
The symmetric characteristic is not inherited by a subproperty of S, e.g. P, since given a P b we cannot 
demonstrate that b P a is true.  All we can say is: 
 a P b ⇒ a S b ⇒ b S a 
However, the asymmetric characteristic is inherited by a subproperty of A, e.g. Q, since if both a Q b and b Q a, 
then we have a A b and b A a, which contradicts the fact that A is asymmetric. 
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  non-male child(ren) no non-male children 
male child(ren)   
no male children   
Figure 6.  Illustrating the complementary nature of some male children and only non-male 
children; the former is shown with horizontal stripes and the latter with vertical.  Hence, not 
some male children is equivalent to only non-male children. 
 
More generally, attention should be given to tracking the alternative mental models, e.g. 
associated with restrictions.  Teaching students initially to externalize these, e.g. 
diagrammatically, would reinforce an awareness of the various possibilities.  
 
8.1.2 Support systems 
 
In some situations it might be useful to automatically generate alternative representations of 
the same semantics, so that the ontologist can see both versions and use whichever is the 
more helpful.  This might be particularly useful where one of the duality laws for restrictions 
can be invoked to give an alternative representation.  The manipulation of statements with 
Boolean constructors, e.g. by using De Morgan‟s laws, could also be helpful in generating 
alternative, more comprehensible, representations. 
 
Visualizations of DL statements could be useful.  Stapleton et al. (2013; 2014) illustrate how 
to represent common DL axioms using concept diagrams, so as to support reasoning about 
those statements.  However, rather than being applied to a whole ontology, visualization 
could also be applied to a subset of the ontology axioms, e.g. the justification for an 
entailment.  This could be done at the request of the ontologist, when difficulties in 
comprehension are being experienced.  Attention should also be given to the choice of 
names; explaining how particular choices can support human reasoning and others lead to 
unwanted implicatures, e.g. of property characteristics. 
 
8.1.3 Syntax 
 
Replacing and and or by intersection and union would be helpful, as would replacing and … 
not by except.  Using the additional keyword solely to indicate the direction of uniqueness in 
a functional object property would also assist ontologists.  Something similar might be useful 
with inverse functional properties, although as discussed later, more work is required to 
determine a suitable keyword and the optimum position.  Replacing some and only by 
including and noneOrOnly might also help, although there may be better alternative 
keywords.  Finally, whilst there may be sound design reasons for using named classes rather 
than anonymous classes in some situations, this may hinder comprehension. 
 
8.2 The role of theory 
 
The research set out to investigate whether theory, from psychology and the philosophy of 
language, could help to explain the difficulties experienced in reasoning about DLs.  Theory 
has served two purposes.  Firstly, it has been used to understand these difficulties, and hence 
to help develop strategies for mitigating them.  This aspect has been present in the research 
relating to Boolean concept constructors and restrictions.  Secondly, psychological theory has 
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been used to provide a measure of complexity, and this has supported research into functional 
object properties. 
 
The discussion of theories of reasoning in section 3 began with the rule-based approach.  The 
reason for this was partly historical; the rule-based theory came first.  Moreover, it is 
necessary to understand this theory to properly appreciate the model-based theory which 
came later and arose in opposition to it.  Whilst the model-based theory has been used to offer 
a possible explanation for some of our experimental results, this is not directly the case for 
the rule-based theory.  No recourse has been made to the kind of logic rules investigated by 
Rips (1983).  However, rule-based reasoning is an example of syntactic reasoning, and there 
were cases where participants appeared to be reasoning syntactically.  Syntactic reasoning 
offers a shortcut over building models, e.g. when syntax identifies obviously complementary 
classes.  When that shortcut is available, human reasoners appear often to take it.  Sometimes 
the shortcut is deceptive and leads to error, e.g. when failing to distinguish between some not 
and not … some.  The choice between the two modes of reasoning may sometimes be a 
matter of personal preference.  Ford (1995) has observed that some people exhibit a 
preference either for syntactic or spatial reasoning, and the latter could be interpreted as a 
kind of model-building. 
 
Both theoretical approaches provide measures of complexity, e.g. related to the number and 
difficulty of the reasoning steps and the number and complexity of the mental models.  
However, in the work with functional object properties, RC theory offered a natural measure 
of complexity which was used to make a controlled comparison between the difficulty of 
reasoning with functional and transitive object properties. 
 
Turning to the philosophy of language, the concept of the implicature helped understand how 
the ideas associated with the natural language keywords only and some can lead human 
reasoners astray when building mental models.  The difficulties associated with the use of 
natural language are discussed in detail in the next subsection. 
 
8.3 The role of natural language 
 
The previous subsection noted the problems associated with the use of only and some.  
Another problem arose with the use of and, specifically when used together with 
complement.  Study 1 showed that complemented intersection was a particular problem in 
MOS.  Study 3 then showed that accuracy could be significantly improved by replacing the 
ambiguous keyword and with the keyword intersection.   
 
Section 3.2 discussed in detail the ambiguities inherent in the use of and and or, which in 
everyday language are frequently resolved by context.  It was shown that, starting from the 
use of and to represent the conjunction of propositions, and could in one context be 
interpreted as meaning union, and in another context as meaning intersection.  This raises a 
particular problem with DLs.  Baader and Nutt (2003) describe DLs as “a family of 
knowledge representation formalisms … equipped with a formal, logic-based semantics”.  
DLs are logic-based; their theoretical development is related to theories of logic.  However, 
from the standpoint of a domain expert using a DL, e.g. OWL, there is a fundamental 
difference between DLs and logic.  Logic, e.g. FOL, is concerned with propositions; DLs are 
concerned with classes.  In everyday English, whilst and is unambiguous when used with 
propositions, conveying the sense of conjunction, when used with classes it can mean either 
intersection or union, and indeed the latter may be the more common meaning. 
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Recent work (Alharbi et al., 2017) demonstrated that novices achieved as much accuracy 
with the German DL syntax as with MOS.  In the reported study, out of a total of 18 tasks, 
there was no significant difference in accuracy for 16 of them.  For the two where there was a 
significant difference, the more accurate results were achieved with German DL.  It needs to 
be remembered that MOS is not natural English.  It is a formal language with keywords, the 
meaning of which need to be learned, just as do the symbols of logic. 
 
The purpose of this discussion is not to reject the use of natural language keywords 
altogether.  Indeed, section 7 reported favourably on the use of except.  The purpose is rather 
to draw attention to the care which needs to be taken when using natural language in 
computer interaction; and the consideration which needs to be given to the meaning which 
words convey in everyday use. 
 
8.4 Future research 
 
The work described here leaves some research questions unresolved, and these are examined 
in subsection 8.4.1.  Subsection 8.4.2 then discusses some alternative methodologies which 
would complement our approach.  Subsection 8.4.3 discusses how alternative theories of 
reasoning, developed more recently, could be relevant to how people interact with 
information.  Finally, subsection 8.4.4 expands the research horizon by discussing alternative 
application areas. 
 
8.4.1 Unresolved questions 
 
The results of study 3 raise some immediate areas for investigation.  One open questions is 
whether alternative keywords to including and noneOrOnly would improve performance with 
the existential and universal restrictions.  For example, Krötzsch et al. (2012), discussing the 
universal restriction, equate the expression ∀parentOf.Female to the English phrases “no 
children other than female ones” and “no children that are not female”.  This suggests 
noneOtherThan or noneNot as alternatives to only.  Discussing the existential restriction, they 
equate ∃parentOf.Female to “individuals that are parents of at least one female individual”.  
This suggests atLeastOne as an alternative to some. 
 
Improving performance with inverse functional properties is another area for research.  In 
study 3, the use of solely immediately before the subject was not successful.  It may be that it 
is not sufficiently clear that solely refers to the subject rather than the object.  An alternative 
keyword, e.g. alone, immediately after the subject and before the object property might better 
convey the subject‟s uniqueness. 
 
The use of object subproperties was examined in study 1 but not further investigated.  The 
keyword SubPropertyOf may be misleading because the prefix sub conveys the implicature 
of inheritance, by analogy with object-oriented programming and everyday English usage.    
If S is a subproperty of P, then this means that a S b implies a P b.  An alternative way of 
specifying this might be to use a keyword which avoids the implicature of inheritance, e.g. S 
implies P.  Looked at this way, a subproperty hierarchy is no more than a chain of inferences.  
Indeed, in everyday English, whilst we talk about subclasses and subsets, we rarely talk about 
subproperties; e.g. „being a sister is a subproperty of being a sibling‟ sounds much less 
natural than „being a sister implies being a sibling‟.  To summarise: in DL, the use of the 
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word „subproperty‟ conveys the implicature of an analogy between subproperty and subclass 
which does not exist. 
 
Inevitably, the studies could not examine all the potentially interesting DL constructs.  One 
such is the use of object properties defined to be inverse.  This was relatively often used 
according to the study of Power and Third (2010) and the survey conducted by the current 
authors (Warren, et al., 2014b). 
 
The work by Alharbi et al. (2017) challenges the conventional view that non-logicians are 
better served by English-based languages rather than the notation of logic.  Certainly, the use 
of a logical notation removes the problems of implicatures associated with keywords, and 
leaves only those problems which are inherent in DLs.  Alharbi et al. (2017) themselves 
comment on the need for more work to compare German DL with MOS.  It would also be 
useful to compare German DL with proposed improvements to MOS.  It might be that 
judicious choice of keywords could improve on German DL. 
 
Recent work by Sarker et al. (2017) has suggested that the use of rules, specifically from the 
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL)
16
 can lead to significant improvements in modelling 
time and accuracy compared with an equivalent OWL representation.  There are difficulties, 
however.  Not all SWRL rules can be represented in DL; and, whilst SWRL itself is 
decidable, the combination of SWRL rules with decidable subsets of OWL can lead to 
undecidability.  Nevertheless, Sarker et al. (2017) suggest “the development of a full-blown 
rule syntax” for OWL.  This goes further than the work reported here, in offering the 
possibility not just of changes to syntax, but of a different modelling paradigm, although 
completely compatible with OWL. 
 
8.4.2 Alternative methodologies 
 
The three studies were concerned with comprehension of, and reasoning with, DL constructs 
identified as being commonly used in ontologies.  Given that one of the motivations of the 
work was the problems experienced by ontologists in understanding the reasoning chain from 
justification to entailment, an alternative approach would be to identify the deduction rules 
commonly used in such reasoning chains.  Nguyen et al. (2012) did this by computing 
entailment-justification pairs.  Another strategy would be to ask ontologists to provide 
entailment-justification pairs which they had found difficult. 
 
Whilst the emphasis in this work has been on comprehension and reasoning, modelling may 
present different problems.  The syntax changes proposed in Section 7 may have an effect on 
modelling performance, and this also needs investigation through controlled experiments.   
 
Controlled experiments offer great insights and are relatively efficient in the use of the 
experimenter‟s time, at the expense of a certain unnaturalness.  A useful complement would 
come through greater interaction with users, in interviews and focus groups, and by 
observation of them in their work. 
 
8.4.3 Alternative theories of reasoning 
 
                                                 
16
 https://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/ 
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The theories of reasoning used here were chosen in part because of their fundamental position 
in reasoning research.  They were the first to offer insight into reasoning and are still of 
interest in the psychological research community.  However, two further developments are 
worth commenting on, since they offer possible additional relevant insights: probabilistic 
models and models of human non-monotonic reasoning.  These models of reasoning may be 
particularly relevant to the presentation of information from the Web, where people need to 
cope with incomplete, incorrect and sometimes inconsistent information, and think in terms 
of probabilities. 
 
For an early discussion of probabilistic models, see Oaksford and Chater (2001), who apply 
the probabilistic approach to conditional inference, Wason‟s selection task and syllogistic 
reasoning.  The use of probabilistic reasoning makes it theoretically possible to unify 
deductive with inductive reasoning.  Deductive reasoning can be seen as reasoning about 
statements with an associated probability equal to one.  Inductive reasoning can be seen as 
reasoning about statements with associated probability potentially less than one. 
 
Non-monotonic reasoning has been observed in humans for some time.  Byrne (1989) gives 
an example based on the following three statements: 
 
1. If she has an essay to write then she will study late in the library. 
2. If the library stays open then she will study late in the library. 
3. She has an essay to write. 
Statements (1) and (3) should lead to the conclusion that “she will study late in the library”.  
However, the presence of statement (2) resulted in 38% of study participants making this 
conclusion and 62% concluding that “she may or may not study late in the library”.  Ragni et 
al. (2016) consider non-monotonic logics and conclude that some “seem to be adequate to 
describe human commonsense reasoning”.  Ideas from non-monotonic logics may be relevant 
to researching how humans reason when a statement (e.g. 2 above) tends to suppress a 
conclusion from other statements (e.g. 1 and 3 above). 
 
8.4.4 Expanding the research horizon 
 
The work reported here has been concerned with applying theories from cognitive 
psychology and philosophy of language to one particular area, that of DLs.  However, 
insights from these disciplines may be applicable to other areas of knowledge representation 
and also knowledge querying. 
 
One such area is that of database interaction.  Database usability has been a subject of 
research since the early days of databases, and some of the discussion echoes some of our 
discussion about DLs.  As an early example, Thomas and Gould (1975) looked at a query 
system using a formal language.  One difficulty they identified was with universal 
quantification.  Conversely, they found little difficulty with conjunction and disjunction.  
However, in an acknowledgement that disjunction and conjunction might prove difficult, they 
attributed this lack of difficulty to a tabular, “nearly wordless” approach.  Shneiderman 
(1978) discusses the difficulty associated with universal quantification.  He also compared 
artificial and natural languages for querying, finding that the latter led to more questions 
which could not be answered from the database.  In another echo of the problems experienced 
with ontologies, Jagadish et al. (2007) commented that database users were having difficulty 
with “the mere complexity of the … schema”. They also commented on the differing 
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expectations of database use and web search.  For example, database systems need to be able 
to explain their results; a feature analogous to providing justifications in ontology debugging.  
However, to the authors‟ knowledge, there has been little exploitation in database research of 
ideas from theories of reasoning or philosophy of language. 
 
Whilst databases are a long-established area of research, the Linked Open Data (LOD) cloud 
is a new one.  It is characterised by relatively simple schema, often using only the constructs 
available in RDFS.  The interrogation mechanism is frequently the SPARQL query language.  
There is evidence that the great majority of queries are relatively simple (Gallego  et al. 2011; 
Möller et al. 2010).  It is an open question whether this is because such queries are all that 
users need; all that they can conceive of; or all that they can easily construct using SPARQL.  
As with databases and DL, there have been experiments with the use of natural language 
(Chang et al. 2015; Rico et al. 2015).  Valid research questions are how natural language and 
visual query languages compare with SPARQL, and to what extent one can apply the insights 
from psychology and language discussed in this paper. 
 
8.5 Final comments 
 
This paper began by noting the adoption of DLs as the dominant KR languages, in place of 
the more psychologically-inspired frame-based paradigm.  Subsequently, there has been very 
considerable attention to the logical and computational properties of DLs, but very little 
attention to their usability.  The major attempt to address usability has been through the 
adoption of MOS.  Yet Alharbi et al. (2017) have called into question the effectiveness of 
MOS when compared with the German DL syntax.  Moreover, the work reported here has 
illustrated that some MOS keywords may be ambiguous.  Additionally, the work of Sarker et 
al. (2017) has challenged the structure of all DL syntaxes, proposing a rule syntax for DL. 
 
This paper has shown that insights from cognitive psychology and language studies can help 
to understand the difficulties experienced with knowledge representation languages, and lead 
to suggestions to mitigate those difficulties.  In the future it is hoped that this approach will 
be extended, e.g. to query languages, and will draw on more recent theories of reasoning, e.g. 
probabilistic and non-monotonic. 
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